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1 Introduction 
The resolving scientific consensus about the causes and implications of climate change presents 
a policy challenge to governments: how to decarbonise economies and adapt them to avoid the 
worst effects of climate change in an efficient, or at least cost-effective, manner. Following 
internationally accepted principles articulated in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, industrialised countries are expected to take the earliest action, for which the 
targets of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol – which expire in 2012 – are seen as a first contribution.1 In 
December 2007, at a UN conference in Bali, Indonesia, the international community began 
negotiations towards a new global climate agreement to deal with the post-2012 period. There 
are high expectations that an ambitious agreement will be reached at the follow-up UN 
conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. This optimism is partly due to the election of 
Barack Obama as president of the United States, who campaigned on a promise to reduce US 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and by a further 80 percent by 2050.2 This 
offers the possibility of a renewed engagement by the United States in the international climate 
regime. Meanwhile the European Council – the regular summit of EU heads of state and 
government – finalised a unilateral commitment in December 2008 to reduce overall EU 
emissions by 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2020; the European Union will extend this 
commitment to 30 percent in the event of a global deal with similar commitments by other 
major industrialised countries. This goal is also seen as a stage in the longer-term aim by 
developed countries to reduce their emissions collectively by 60-80 percent by 2050. The 
common EU position and the improved possibility of a renewed global response sends a signal 
to stakeholders in Ireland that the debate about climate change has turned from whether to act to 
how to act.3  
 
The Irish Government faces the political challenge of contributing to this ambitious EU goal 
even though its own emissions have been rising since 1990, the baseline year of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Ireland may technically meet its commitments up to 2012 – set under an EU 
agreement at an increase of no more than 13 percent above 1990 levels – through the effects of 
the economic downturn and a mixture of limited domestic policies and measures and the 
possible purchase of additional permits via international trading. But the country will require 
more ambitious domestic policies and measures to contribute to the longer-term targets that the 
                                                 
1 The UNFCCC was negotiated in 1992. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is a subordinate treaty to the UNFCCC 
2 George W. Bush also campaigned with a pledge to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, although his subsequent 
jettisoning of this promise was one of the early acts of his Administration. 
3 The European Commission launched a public consultation on the approach the European Union should take on 
the global post-2012 climate change agreement, following the Commission's Communication "Limiting Global 
Climate Change to 2° Celsius: The way ahead for 2020 and beyond". 
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European Union has set for the period to 2020, depending on the timing of the economic up-
turn, and certainly for the period beyond. 
 
Climate change is a great and wide-ranging form of market failure (as described in the Stern 
Review: HM Treasury, 2006). The pricing of global resources (in this case the Earth’s 
atmosphere) does not take appropriate account of the services they provide or their scarcity, and 
actors in the global economic system can make financial gains from activities that disregard the 
long-term collective interest of the planet. Such resources that are not naturally subject to 
anybody’s control are prone to the “tragedy of the commons”, a well-documented situation 
where free access and unrestricted demand leads to over-exploitation (Hardin, 1968). As with 
other kinds of market failure, climate change calls on governments to intervene with policies 
and measures that benefit society as a whole. Government intervention can correct for this 
market failure by providing an enabling framework, through legislation, incentives, and above 
all the predictability of forward planning.  
 
Policy intervention is necessary to change Ireland’s emissions trajectory. The costs of not 
intervening, as identified by many studies, are likely to be much higher than the costs of 
appropriate action. This article surveys some of the options available to the Irish government. 
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2 Trends, policy and principles 
The overall trend in Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions has until recently been a fairly steady 
rise since 1990, the baseline year for most greenhouse gas emissions, the main exception being 
a significant but temporary drop in emissions in 2003 due to some industrial plant closures and 
the replacement of some oil with natural gas for electricity generation. Emissions in 2006 stood 
at 69.8 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (Mt CO2e) and were 25.5 percent above 1990 baseline 
estimate (EPA 2008a). The most significant and sustained increase has been in the transport 
sector, where emissions have increased by at least 165 percent since 1990, due almost entirely 
to road transport. Emissions from the energy-industries sector (mainly electricity generation) in 
2006 were 31.6 percent above 1990 levels: although these emissions had declined since 2001, 
the commissioning of new peat-fired electricity generating plant has affected levels. Emissions 
in the agriculture sector increased over the course of the 1990s but have recently declined as a 
result of a reduction in both livestock populations and fertiliser use. Emissions from the 
residential sector fell somewhat as households shifted from coal and peat to oil and natural gas, 
but this trend has been countered by recent increases in population and housing stock. 
Emissions from the industry sector, following increases to 2001, have stabilised somewhat in 
recent years. 
 
Taking account of the downturn to date, Ireland may achieve its Kyoto target because of the 
exceptional economic circumstances. Attention must however turn to 2020 for which the targets 
have 2005 as their base year. Ireland’s emissions in the non-ETS sector are subject to a target 
fall of 20 per cent on their 2005 level. For the ETS sector specifically, there are no national 
targets but the target for the EU’s ETS sector overall is for a 21 per cent decline on 2005 levels. 
For the sake of argument, assuming a simple pro rata decline in Ireland’s ETS emissions would 
thus require at least a 20 per cent cut in total emissions by Ireland by 2020. In quantity terms, 
this is a target of some 56 million tonnes of CO2e in 2020, compared to the 69.9 million tonnes 
emitted in 2005.  
 
Economic conditions make forecasting particularly difficult at present but, on the basis of 
plausible assumptions and current trends, emissions in 2020 could be somewhat similar to their 
2005 level. This would mean that some 20 per cent reduction still has to be made on the 2020 
figure compared to a 40 per cent cut based on pre-recession projections. This target is still very 
demanding. If, on foot of international co-operation, the European Union adopts the more 
ambitious 30 per cent cut, Ireland’s 2020 target could drop further to some 48 million tonnes. 
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(DEHLG 2007, 18; CEC, 2008: Fitz Gerald et al, 2008, update on chapter 5). Policies other than 
the efficient one are not a sensible option.   
 
 The current international approach to estimating emissions calculates emissions that actually 
occur in the country in question. A country could consume large amounts of imported goods 
that are emissions-intensive in the making, and these would not be reflected in its accounts; 
meanwhile emissions from its cattle or its electricity production, though consumed abroad, are 
included. Guidelines for measuring emissions would be more consistent if either emissions due 
to consumption or emissions due to production were counted. Arguably, a more accounting 
methodology would measure consumption, insofar as the action of using the electricity or eating 
the meat is what drives the production that causes emissions. This would also avoid misreading 
emissions patterns due to the movement of dirty industries abroad – a phenomenon known as 
“carbon leakage”. If the emissions embodied in Ireland’s imports were calculated4 and included, 
and emissions embodied in exports were excluded, some 33 million tonnes of CO2 were emitted 
in producing Ireland’s imports in 2005, while 11 million tonnes were emitted in Ireland in 
producing goods for consumption abroad. This casts Ireland’s performance in a truer but even 
less favourable light, and goes some way to explain the strong reduction in the emissions 
intensity of Ireland’s GDP. With emissions based on production, developing countries (which 
produce and export carbon) will find themselves asked to do proportionately more than their 
own carbon consumption dictates (Helm, 2008a; IEA2008). 
2.1 Climate policy in Ireland to date 
 
Irish emissions have until recently been increasing above Ireland’s international commitments 
and stated domestic policy goals. The present economic downturn, while affording a breathing 
space, risks masking the underlying trend. This failure is a result of an insufficiently clear 
strategy on climate change and a lack of a coordinated approach across different government 
departments and agencies since climate change rose to prominence as a national policy issue. 
The 2000 National Climate Change Strategy contained a number of measures that could have 
helped constrain Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions but its most important component, the 
carbon tax, as well as specific measures like the conversion of the Moneypoint coal-fired 
electricity generating plant to natural-gas firing, were not implemented.5 In the meantime, major 
infrastructure programmes have been implemented without full consideration of their likely 
                                                 
4 For example, as calculated for Ireland in The Medium Term Review 2008-2015 (Fitz Gerald et al, 2008). This is 
sometimes called ‘virtual’ or ‘embedded’ emissions. Figure 5.4 in the Review shows carbon dioxide emissions 
from Final Demand within Ireland, which includes imports. 
 
5 Moneypoint was extensively refurbished to install sulphur scrubbers instead. 
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impact on emissions. For example, a network of motorways has been built to stimulate 
economic growth, but the lack of warranted investment in public transport and the absence of 
controls on urban sprawl have allowed these investments to drive up transport-related emissions 
(Morgenroth and Fitz Gerald, 2006). These are long-term investments whose true value for 
money might have been lower if the cost of their associated carbon emissions had been taken 
into account at the time of their appraisal. These investments are likely to lock transport in to its 
current pattern for decades or longer. 
 
The manner in which policy is developed in Ireland helps to explain the historical failure to 
grapple with the challenge of climate change. Much national policy in Ireland is developed 
through consultative processes, particularly through the Social Partnership, a forum where 
representatives of Government, employers, trade unions, farming interests and other sectors 
negotiate wage agreements and other policy directions. The Social Partnership has been 
successful in aligning Ireland’s economic and social policies while improving competitiveness 
and avoiding inflation and has been credited with leading the country out of the political, 
economic and social crises of the 1980s (O’Donnell 1998, 11). But until recently the Social 
Partnership paid scant attention to climate change and it has excluded environmental groups 
from the parties represented in the negotiations.6 The absence of this subject from the primary 
forum for policy agenda-setting may have relegated climate change to a subject of secondary 
importance. At the same time radical policy change in Ireland has been hostage to important 
sectoral interests. The failure of the government to introduce a carbon tax in 2004 was partly 
due to active lobbying by business groups and opposition from within the government itself: the 
then-minister for finance, Charlie McCreevy, said that the tax would bring minimal emission 
reductions at a high bureaucratic cost. In this he was supported by some trade unions, who said 
that a carbon tax would have a disproportionate effect on the poor. Although these claims were 
disputed at the time (by, among others, the then chairman of Sustainable Energy Ireland and by 
research from the Economic and Social Research Institute, which showed that the potentially 
regressive effect of a carbon tax could be offset by directing some of the revenues to social 
welfare), the lack of a champion from within the policymaking system undermined the case for 
the carbon tax.7 Another feature is the idiosyncratic electoral system in Ireland in which all 
politicians, including ministers, are elected by proportional representation in multi-seat 
                                                 
6 The current agreement, “Towards 2016”, has a specific chapter on “environmental sustainability” (Government of 
Ireland 2006). The previous agreement, Partnership 2000, contained a few references to the environment, mainly 
in the context of agriculture. The concept of sustainable development appeared prominently in the 2006 strategy of 
the National Economic and Social Council, Strategy 2006: People, Productivity and Purpose. 
7 “Government ‘underestimated’ effect of abandoned carbon tax”, Irish Times, 29 November 2004; Scott & Eakins 
2004 
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constituencies, making them particularly sensitive to sectional issues at the occasional expense 
of national priorities.  
 
But such systemic explanations only go so far to explain why Ireland is not engaging in optimal 
policies to meet its national greenhouse gas emission commitments. Indeed, the successful 
national response via the Social Partnership to the economic and social crises of the 1980s 
suggests that with the same kind of understanding, political leadership and cross-sector 
participation, reducing greenhouse gas emissions could be attainable. It may also be helpful for 
policymakers that Ireland is bound by international climate-change commitments. In 2004, 
opponents of the carbon tax could plausibly argue that the Kyoto Protocol might fail; today, in 
contrast, “no action” is not a possible response to the challenge of climate change given that 
Ireland is obliged under EU and UN commitments to reduce its emissions or pay for equivalent 
emission permits on the international market, a potentially large capital outflow that could pose 
political difficulties of its own. The new commitment that environmental interests will be 
represented in the Social Partnership as well as the strengthened capacity of Comhar Sustainable 
Development Council (a multi-stakeholder forum that provides advice to government on 
environmental and other issues) can help to articulate the case for long-term climate action. 
2.2 Underlying principles for the next phase of Irish climate policy  
 
The next phase of Ireland’s response to climate change is currently being developed. The 
background to this response is an increased certainty about the urgency of climate change and 
the likelihood of new international cooperation within the framework of the UNFCCC (and 
propelled by a newly engaged United States). At the same time there is the strong possibility of 
a widespread and prolonged economic depression following the international financial crises of 
2008. Ireland’s response should therefore be circumspect and should be based on the following 
basic principles: 
 
1. Minimised cost of abatement: Science informs long-term targets. R&D, demonstration and 
analysis inform abatement options and cost. The marginal abatement cost curve (the MAC 
curve) underlies the cost to the economy of reducing its emissions. Given a quantity target, 
the MAC curve enables one to read off the permit price that would encourage abatement to 
occur up to the target level; abatement is encouraged because it would be cheaper than 
paying the permit price. Alternatively, given a price, one could read off the quantity of 
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abatement that polluters would find worthwhile in order to avoid paying the permit price.8 
Governments are not and cannot be omniscient about technologies or individual 
circumstances, and usually the bodies concerned are in a better position than governments to 
determine their best reduction methods and their timing. Picking technologies can have 
disappointing outcomes for governments, as seen in their promotion of bio-fuels (Ryan et 
al., 2006). Side effects can also be harmful, as seen in Germany’s over-generous subsidies to 
solar panels – the increase in demand for silicon to manufacture photovoltaic cells 
temporarily drove up the price of silicon and impeded adoption of solar panels in more 
suitable sunny countries.9 It is also wasteful to have multiple and rigid targets as these can 
unwittingly impose high abatement costs. It is better to facilitate flexibility by ensuring a 
framework that provides the overall incentive to reduce emissions.  
 
Examples of marginal abatement cost curves reproduced from the recent report of the UK 
Committee on Climate Change are presented below in Figure 1 (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2008). The upper graph refers to the UK transport sector and the lower graph to the 
residential sector. The horizontal axis measures emissions reductions. Going from left to 
right are the possible ways of reducing emissions in increasing order of cost. Measured on 
the vertical axis is the cost of reducing emissions per tonne of CO2. It is seen that some 
reductions can be achieved at zero or even negative cost. Other UK sectors covered in the 
report include industry, power, waste and so forth and the estimates relate to realistic 
potential technologies. Technical improvements would cause the curves, or sections of them, 
to be revised downwards, because they make it cheaper to reduce emissions. (The role of 
research and development is discussed below.) 
 
The marginal abatement costs can be aggregated over all sectors to give national costs of 
reduction. As stated, checking the target level of reductions, or cap, against the national 
curve enables one to read off the cost of the last unit abated.10 This marginal cost is the price 
or tax that would encourage achievement of the target, because all the actions to the left 
would be cheaper than the tax. A target reduction that is larger (further to the right) is seen 
from the figure to cost more, as higher cost abatements have to be adopted. The MAC curve 
                                                 
8 The same schedule of abatement costs underlies a regime of permit trading or of carbon taxes. The price of 
permits that results from trading reflects the participants’ (true or perceived) marginal abatement costs at that time 
and subject to the fixed quantity.  
9 “More light than heat”, The Economist, 7 April 2008.  
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10989479 
10 The marginal abatement cost is distinct from the marginal damage cost. The latter, sometimes referred to as the 
social cost of carbon, is a measure of the damage done by an extra tonne of CO2 emitted. This is the damage of 
climate change, which is highly uncertain, and by contrast it declines as pollution is reduced. Checking it against 
the estimated marginal abatement cost curve would give the theoretical optimum reduction and price. 
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underpins emissions mitigation regardless of policy measure adopted. Naturally there are 
many uncertainties. Side benefits, for example, could extend the scope of reductions by 
increasing the uptake of technologies, and costs could be driven down in unexpected ways. 
On the other hand there could also be behavioural barriers.  
 
Some sixty-two estimates of the world MAC have been made by various researchers based 
on least-cost trajectories of global efforts to meet stabilisation targets. Kuik et al. (2009) 
have recently assessed these estimates as a group. The estimates are based on numerous 
assumptions as to the stabilisation target and baseline, the extent of flexibility in the path of 
reductions over the time period and on whether or not all greenhouse gases are included, and 
so forth. As expected, it is found that the more stringent the target the higher the abatement 
cost, while flexibility with respect to timing of reductions and inclusion of all greenhouse 
gases (rather than merely CO2) reduces the cost. Kuik et al. then extend this exercise to 
derive a kind of consensus global cost of carbon that would be needed to achieve a range of 
reduction targets expressed in terms of CO2 concentrations in parts per million by volume 
(ppm). To achieve the long-term target of 450 ppm of CO2 equivalent, which is more or less 
consistent with the EU’s 2oC warming target11, the central CO2 price in 2025 could be some 
€129 per tonne but with a wide range of uncertainty from €69 to €241 per tonne. In 2050 the 
price could be€225 per tonne, with a range from €128 to €396 per tonne. 
 
                                                 
11  This approximate temperature rise of 2°C is the IPCC’s Class 1 of scenarios, which corresponds to 350-400 ppm 
of CO2 or 445-490 ppm of CO2-equivalent (Nakicenovic et al., 2007). 
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Figure 1: Cost and technical potentials for reducing CO2 emissions in the UK  
 
Road transport in UK – MAC curve 
 
 
Residential sector in UK – MAC curve 
 
Source: CCC, 2008 
 
2. Equal emissions price. Charging everybody the same emissions price promotes cheapest 
abatement. Some abatement is expensive and should be given less priority. For example, 
some (not all) transport abatement is very expensive. One needs to consider the net costs of 
reducing emissions, which can be high if the benefits of transport are high. An equal 
emissions price has the benefit of not encouraging high-cost abatement at the expense of 
missing out on (possibly unknown and even unknowable) low-cost possibilities. People who 
have only high-cost options would pay the relatively cheaper carbon price instead. Therefore 
an equal price needs to attach to all carbon emissions, otherwise the cost of action will 
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increase significantly. Every emission causes damage and imposes a non-zero cost. This 
“social cost of carbon”, though only possible to estimate very approximately and within a 
wide range, would ideally be the set price.12 All need to face the cost of emitting otherwise 
some cheap options may be omitted, raising the cost to society as a whole of achieving its 
reductions. Such flexibility ought not to be confined to be within one’s borders. The 
cheapest abatement projects need to be taken on regardless of where they are, given that 
funds are not limitless. 
 
3. Minimise any negative macro-economic effect. The levels of reduction under 
consideration for the long term are so large that the issue has to be viewed as a macro-
economic one. Subsidies to encourage emissions reductions would have to be financed from 
taxes and taxes have a deadweight effect on the economy. Pollution taxes, such as carbon 
levies, too can deflate the economy, but revenues from pollution taxes can be used to replace 
other undesirable taxes and in this way potential macro-economic harm is restrained and 
may even be overcome. Thus “compensating the economy” should not be over-looked. 
Meanwhile, technological developments could be a great boon in reducing the cost of 
reducing emissions (reduce the MAC curve). Given that invention and demonstration 
provide public benefits not captured by the originator, these activities are unlikely to be 
undertaken to their ideal level without government support.  
 
In sum, keeping down the cost of reducing emissions has to be a major concern. The targets are 
very demanding and risk being expensive to achieve, even in macro-economic terms. The 
objective should be to enable the people with best knowledge to choose how to change their 
ways, subject to real incentives and without imposing excess net taxation on the economy. 
 
                                                 
12 The “social cost of carbon” is the marginal damage caused by an additional ton of carbon emissions. The range, 
which is obviously wide, is very sensitive to the assumptions underlying the estimations. The optimal price of 
carbon is that at which this equates with the marginal abatement cost. For estimates of the social cost of carbon, see 
Tol ( 2008). 
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3 A survey of climate policy options available to Ireland 
Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in absolute terms should be the overarching priority for 
climate policy in Ireland. Although Ireland’s total contribution to international greenhouse gas 
emissions is miniscule, the country could make a worthwhile contribution as a demonstration 
that intelligent policy reform can lead to reduced absolute emissions while generating other 
social and economic benefits.13 But an aggressive approach to climate policy in Ireland will be 
controversial to many economic actors, particularly at a time of international financial crisis, 
because climate policy is often associated with additional costs to industry. Nevertheless, 
although reducing emissions raises legitimate questions about costs, with appropriate policies 
there need be no impact on competitiveness for the economy as a whole. Even though there may 
be real impacts on limited specific sectors, these sectors (or even individual companies) could 
negotiate a targeted policy approach and need not become a brake on national policy. The cost 
consideration may weigh in favour of promoting some domestic emissions reduction over 
international trading. The National Climate Change Strategy 2007-2012 foresaw an outlay of 
€270 million to purchase emissions credits on the international market, which assumes a permit 
price of about €15 a tonne of CO2e (DEHLG 2007, 17-18); the price of carbon on the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme, currently about in the region of €10 (February 2009), is volatile but 
projected to rise by 2020 and beyond.14 Depending then on the relative cost of abatement at 
home, relying on international trading could represent a saving or a growing burden on the 
national economy. On the other hand, implementing cost-effective emissions reductions is in 
itself a sound investment in the future. If Ireland fails to take cost-effective action early in the 
process it could be faced with an increasingly expensive task of reducing its emissions later, or 
purchasing ever larger amounts of emission permits.15 The potential costs of inaction to society 
as a whole must therefore be considered alongside the costs of action.  
 
At the same time, adaptation to climate change presents opportunities as well as challenges. 
Climate change policy (whether involving mitigation or adaptation) is likely to be disruptive for 
some sectors, but this does not mean that its overall impact will be negative in the long term. 
Indeed, successive European Commission studies have found that tackling climate change could 
have (limited) positive impacts on economic growth and employment across the European 
Union provided that appropriate policies are in place, with some important shifts in employment 
patterns between sectors (ETUC 2007, 182). Businesses that have low energy requirements or 
                                                 
13 It is noteworthy that the plastic bag levy (introduced in 2002) has become an international icon in environmental 
policy. Ireland also has little tradition in the type of science and engineering that reduces greenhouse emissions. 
14 Point Carbon, http://www.pointcarbon.com/,  
15 At some later date the effects also of climate change may be felt in Ireland (European Commission, 2007, 9). 
 13
deal with the technologies that are suited to a low-carbon economy will prosper in a carbon-
constrained economy, and Ireland could benefit by being among the first movers in this 
significant area of future economic development. 
 
The various policy approaches to address climate change can be divided somewhat arbitrarily 
into several broad categories. The rest of this section is a discussion of the pros and cons of the 
following approaches: 
 
• Legislative 
• Market- and incentive-based 
• Standards & regulations 
• Subsidies 
• Research & development 
3.1 Legislative instruments 
 
Irish policymakers must now operate under the assumption that reducing emissions is an 
unavoidable priority. The first objective of climate policy in Ireland should therefore be to 
create the necessary political certainty for all economic actors that Ireland will be bound by a 
real carbon constraint. One way to provide this certainty would be to enact a legally binding 
long-term target, as several jurisdictions have already done. California passed a bill in 2006 
requiring a reduction in CO2 emissions by 80 percent by 2050, and the UK parliament adopted a 
similar measure requiring reductions of CO2 emissions by 60 percent by 2050. Reducing 
Ireland’s emissions by 2050 to about 11 MtCO2e would equal an approximate 80 percent 
reduction below Ireland’s 1990 levels, a pro-rata contribution to the overall EU target of 
reducing emissions by 60-80 percent by 2050. Friends of the Earth Ireland proposed a Climate 
Bill that would oblige the Government to effect annual reductions in Ireland’s greenhouse gas 
emissions of 3 percent (FoEI 2007) to lead to reductions of 60 percent below 1990 levels by 
2050; an 80 percent target (to about 10 MtCO2e) would require average annual cuts of 4 
percent.16  
 
An advantage of such a legislative approach is that it presents an additional degree of certainty 
for Government departments, private businesses and other stakeholders under which to plan 
future operations. Furthermore, politicians would be discouraged from postponing some 
politically difficult decisions until after the next election cycle. A system of interim (e.g. annual, 
five-yearly) targets could be strengthened by a transparent facility for “borrowing” from future 
targets, with appropriate interest, or “banking” better-than-expected reductions to encourage 
                                                 
16 See Annex 1 for calculations 
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over-compliance. The drawback of a legislative approach is that the penalties for non-
compliance could be difficult to define or enforce as it is hard to see how penalties for non-
achievement would be applied. Targets have to be informed by the estimated costs to which a 
country is committing itself and abatement costs for large reductions in emissions are likely to 
be high, although possibly tempered by technological developments that may have occurred in 
the meantime. To be credible the negotiating stance of interested sectors needs to be backed up 
by independent research. Costs in any event are uncertain and at the same time the nature of the 
climate problem can alter so this too has to be taken into consideration. Inevitably such targets 
are aspirational. To ensure political certainty therefore, a long-term national target could be set 
and made to define national actions, although this target does not need to have the force of law. 
 
3.1.1 Climate Change Commission 
In any case, a target on its own is not a policy. Accompanying measures such as an annual 
carbon budget17 and strategy review will be necessary to drive action and, crucially, policy 
coherence across different government departments and agencies. The proposed Climate 
Change Commission foreseen in the National Climate Change Strategy could play an important 
role. The commission would be a new body with the authority to “monitor and assess Ireland’s 
progress in addressing climate change and to increase awareness in all sectors of the 
opportunities and challenges presented by the transition to a low-carbon economy” (DEHLG, 
2007, 48). An appropriately resourced commission with the necessary mandate and 
independence could play two useful roles. First, it should undertake a continuous review of 
Ireland’s climate performance, throwing light on costs of emissions abatement and effectiveness 
of policies and measures and possible improvements. Second, it could play a role in effecting an 
open and iterative process of policy coordination, including public participation and submission. 
This is necessary to generate the level of debate and public trust that will be required to bring 
about the necessary changes, some of which could be disruptive to individual sectors of social 
groups. As part of its investigation of abatement costs, the commission could help identify the 
contributions that individual parts of the economy could play and act as clearing house for 
information to help different actors contribute. No less importantly, it could act as a non-
partisan source of political pressure to help the public determine whether specific policies 
proposed by any government department or authority are consistent with the national priority of 
reducing Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and socially just way. 
                                                 
17 The Programme for Government instituted a carbon budget (p. 19) as a reporting mechanism. This is in contrast 
to the approach outlined in a report by ECOFYS/Friends of the Earth United Kingdom, which suggests that the 
carbon budget could act as an instrument for allocating rights to scarce allowances permitted under a legally 
binding national cap (Gilbert & Reece 2006. 15) 
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3.1.2 The use of the international flexible mechanisms in reaching the national target 
An important question to resolve at the outset is the extent to which Ireland should reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions through domestic policies and measures as opposed to relying on 
reductions made abroad, through the international carbon market. The Kyoto Protocol allows 
countries to trade their emission allocations and also permits the use of two project mechanisms 
– Joint Implementation (JI), which entails projects undertaken jointly by industrialised 
countries, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), consisting of projects funded by 
developed countries but executed in developing countries. Ireland has already decided to 
purchase up to €270 million worth of credits from abroad for the period 2008-2012 if necessary. 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme also allows entities to purchase a limited amount of credits 
from the project mechanisms.  
 
In theory, international emission trading provides a flexible way for countries or companies to 
meet their emission targets by allowing them to use lower-cost credits from a project that occurs 
elsewhere. The advantage of the project mechanisms is that they can reduce abatement costs by 
providing firms with additional choice and flexibility in reducing emissions. Developing 
countries stand to benefit from the transfer of technology that accompanies some projects. In 
practice, however, these mechanisms face practical difficulties in implementation that distance 
them from the theoretical ideal to something closer to nominal compliance. Many projects do 
not cause the abatement of any “additional” carbon emissions – they simply award credits to 
projects that would have happened anyway,18 and there are reports of artificial increases in 
emissions (Wara, 2007). In the case of the CDM the majority of project funding goes to just a 
few countries (e.g. China and India) and most projects are large, e.g. the elimination of 
industrial greenhouse gases. Another key difficulty is that the carbon benefits of some projects, 
particularly from afforestation and reforestation, are difficult to measure and may not be 
permanent (the forests may be cut down in the future). This is why the European Union has 
excluded credits from forestry, land use and land-use change from the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme. 
 
A critical issue is the absence of carbon pricing for about one half of Irish emissions, as the non-
ETS emissions are not subject to a carbon tax. Therefore, while people gain credits by investing 
in abatement abroad, home owners investing in domestic efficiency measures, for example, do 
not gain from carbon savings relative to their neighbours who don’t invest. Furthermore the 
neighbour can free-ride on the investor’s contribution to the national effort. We saw the sort of 
                                                 
18 “Beware the carbon offsetting cowboys”, Financial Times, 26 April 2007. This is not to mention the transactions 
costs including commissions and the creation of a new layer of market functionaries. 
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unexploited opportunities that exist in the domestic MAC curve, above, and this is an example 
of the distortions resulting from failure to impose one price to all for carbon. 
 
Flexible mechanisms have a role but we note the arguments for circumscribing their use. Since 
lower-cost abatement opportunities may exist abroad, restricting mitigation to domestic action 
could raise costs to controlled sectors. But extensive recourse to international trading may not 
be optimal for society as a whole because money spent on credits from abroad is lost to Ireland, 
as are any secondary benefits that would have accrued from emission reductions at home (e.g. 
reduced air pollution generally from reduced consumption of fossil fuels). As explained, there 
are lower-cost abatement opportunities in Ireland that current policies do not bring about. The 
principle of “supplementarity”, i.e. a preference for domestic abatement over the international 
flexible mechanisms, is enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol;19 it is also reiterated in the EU 
Directives governing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which set out limits on the extent to 
which credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms can be used in the scheme.20 
Although restricting abatement to domestic measures robs third countries of the benefits of 
project mechanisms, e.g. technology transfer, a more considered use of the project mechanisms 
could help resolve these issues.21 Discriminating in favour of best-practice projects using 
correct prices can help ensure that the benefits of investment and technology transfer are shared 
among more developing countries and a range of socially beneficial project types.  
                                                
 
The transfer of technology to developing countries is vital. Some technologies, such as those 
that enhance energy efficiency, may diffuse in the absence of a targeted policy through the 
ordinary globalisation process of international trade and foreign investments. However, the 
diffusion of specifically climate friendly technologies and the actions of multinationals need 
investigation through research (Popp, 2008). In particular encouragement to promoting 
knowledge spillovers may need extra support from developed countries. 
 
 
19 Article 6.1 (d): “The acquisition of emission reduction units [from project mechanisms] shall be supplemental to 
domestic actions”; Article 17: “Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of 
meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments”. There is no current legal definition or 
guidance to what “supplemental” means in practice, but the possibilities for worthwhile abatement in Ireland 
suggest that a sizable effort should be through domestic policies and measures.  
20 “The plan shall specify the maximum amount of CERs and ERUs which may be used by operators in the 
Community scheme as a percentage of the allocation of the allowances to each installation. The percentage shall be 
consistent with the Member State’s supplementarity obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and decisions adopted 
pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol.” Directive 2004/101/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC, quoted 
in Grian (2005) 
21 The potential benefit of flexibility is well established and applies broadly. For example, within the EU, a first 
best solution is shown to be a single market for all emissions, that is, between agents that are in or outside the EU 
ETS and between member states, rather than to have targets for each of these entities (Tol, 2008) 
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Another potential source of international carbon credits may become available in the form of 
credits from avoided deforestation in tropical countries. The UN negotiations are expected to 
lead to the adoption of a new mechanism, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD), by which developed countries will compensate developing countries for 
not clearing their forests (and therefore foregoing the financial benefits that they would have 
gained from exploiting their forests). The mechanism could play a significant role in the global 
climate regime, given that approximately 20 percent of current annual global emissions come 
from deforestation. Ireland, like other developed countries, is likely to benefit from this 
mechanism, but it should be cognisant of potential negative consequences of a mechanism that 
protects forest carbon at the expense of biodiversity or local communities that currently rely on 
the forests (the details of the mechanism have not been settled, so such negative outcomes may 
not materialise). Current effort should be directed to promoting the best possible design of the 
REDD mechanism from a broad perspective of sustainable development. In line with Ireland’s 
priorities in official development assistance, once the mechanism is in place Ireland should seek 
to discriminate in favour of good-quality REDD projects, as with the other flexible mechanisms. 
 
Given the amount of credits (some of dubious quality) that may be available on the international 
market, a country could be in technical compliance with an international commitment without 
reducing any of its own emissions nor, in practice, contributing to any global reduction. To 
rectify this, the Government could indicate the manner to which it intends to rely on the Kyoto 
Protocol’s (or any successor treaty) flexible mechanisms, as opposed to reducing emissions 
through domestic policies and measures. The Government could set conditions for determining 
the level of reliance on foreign abatement measures. Properly explicit costs of domestic 
alternatives would determine the correct use of the flexible mechanisms. The Government 
would also want to define how projects under flexible mechanisms will be evaluated and ensure 
that minimum criteria on sustainable practices are met. This position should be promoted 
internationally to encourage other countries to drive the market for good-quality projects. 
 
3.1.3 Domestic projects 
Another way of approaching the use of projects to offset emissions elsewhere is to look at 
projects that take place at home. A voluntary offset scheme could provide a worthwhile means 
for Government departments and agencies as well as individuals to reduce their nominal carbon 
emissions. The provision in the Programme for Government to offset all official air travel 
Government of Ireland 2007b, 20) is welcome if it encourages alternatives to travel, rather than 
merely raises government costs, though such encouragement could be minor given that the 
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officials concerned do not pay. The beneficiaries in voluntary offset schemes should be 
expanded to include other kinds of projects beyond “urban forests” (as currently proposed) and 
should not be restricted to Ireland. Funding domestic projects is potentially a better use of 
public money than purchasing international credits where they are not properly linked to 
verifiable emission reductions.  
 
Even in lieu of any formal domestic project mechanism, however, the public sector can play a 
large role. The Government is one of the State’s largest economic actors. It is the State’s largest 
single landlord and tenant through its occupation of public buildings and its provision of social 
housing. It maintains a large fleet and has control over many of the State’s public transport 
providers. It has bulk purchasing power. More than many private-sector actors, it has the ability 
to base economic decisions on a timeframe of 20 years and longer. In these and other areas the 
public sector should be stating its emissions, attaching a price to them and adopting highest 
standards, consistent with value for money. 
3.2 Market- and incentive-based instruments 
 
Market- and incentive-based instruments – particularly fiscal measures and emissions trading 
systems – are intended to put a price on emitting carbon.22 Market-based instruments are 
particularly appropriate for addressing climate change. This is because of the varying potential 
and range of costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the incentives that such instruments 
can offer individual actors to reduce emissions, and the benefit of dynamic efficiency due to the 
continuous incentive for the adoption of better abatement technologies. As they put a price on 
emissions they have the special advantage of addressing the underlying problem that harmful 
actions are not charged for.  
 
But as mentioned, a price currently only applies to about a half of Irish carbon emissions, that 
is, to the sectors that participate in the Emissions Trading Scheme. As already outlined, if the 
price is not charged to all emitters, including small enterprises and households, opportunities to 
reduce carbon emissions will be missed. Without a price, energy-saving measures that would 
have good present values (paybacks) at that carbon price risk only being undertaken by the 
                                                 
22 The OECD (2008) has simulated stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at 450 ppm CO2 equivalent over the 
longer term and found the costs of action to be 0.5% of GDP by 2030 and 2.5 percent by 2050. The policy scenario 
assumed the introduction of a globally-harmonised carbon tax, which is pre-announced so that investors take 
rational decisions. If OECD countries alone implement a carbon tax starting at $25/tonne of CO2 in 2008, this 
would lead to a 43 percent reduction in OECD greenhouse gas emissions. However, global emissions would still be 
38 percent higher in 2050 compared to the 2000 levels. If Brazil, China, India and Russia follow suit with the same 
policy in 2020, and the rest of the world in 2030, global greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 could be brought down 
to the 2000 levels (0 percent increase). 
 19
dedicated. The consequence would be that more effort has to be applied in other areas, areas 
that may be more expensive (European Commission, 2007a). A priority for the Government is 
therefore to establish a price on all carbon to make energy/carbon-intensive activities more 
expensive relative to other activities. This is most efficiently achieved through a domestic 
carbon tax, as will be described. Other fiscal instruments under the heading include emissions 
trading and user pricing, especially for road transport.  
 
3.2.1 Carbon taxes 
The all-important aspect of a carbon tax is that it can set a long-term credible price on emitting 
carbon. This would provide incentives for would-be investors in technical advances and for 
consumers to switch to more energy-efficient heating systems or implement energy-saving 
measures, such as improving insulation. A carbon tax was announced in the 2007 Programme 
for Government but has not yet been introduced (as of February 2009). Ireland has had good 
experience with fiscal-type measures. In recent years there has been the introduction of 
payment-by-weight for rubbish, which resulted in a reduction of over 30 per cent in one 
instance studied; the introduction of metered water charges by a group water schemes with up to 
40 per cent reduction in water use; and the introduction of the plastic bag levy, which has 
reduced consumption of plastic bags by over 80 percent. These measures have been especially 
well-suited to their situations and involved a stiff price rise. A carbon tax set at a rate of, say, 
€20 per tonne of CO2 may have a minor initial effect on emissions, but its impact would lie in 
its long-run certainty. See Annex 2 for examples of different rates of carbon tax applied to the 
main fuels used. 
 
Carbon taxation can correct the market failure arising in energy use by simply charging emitters 
for the damage done by CO2 emitted by combustion. Carbon taxation is a more effective 
instrument for reducing energy-sector CO2 emissions than other kinds of taxation on energy per 
se because it discriminates fairly between energy sources according to their greenhouse gas 
content (Stavins 1997, 9). The abatement achieved by carbon taxes and the effect of the tax on 
the economy depend on several factors, including the point of application of the tax and what is 
done with the revenue. Studies undertaken by the ESRI and others since 1992, shortly after the 
European Commission23 had proposed such an approach, have consistently shown that their 
macro-economic impact depends on the use to which the revenues are put, after low-income 
households have been helped. Their impact can be depressing or mildly favourable (Fitz Gerald 
and McCoy, 1992, Fitz Gerald et al, 2002, Bergin et al, 2004, Conefrey et al, 2008). The latter 
                                                 
23 Delbeke, 1991. 
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favourable result refers specifically to the case where the bulk of the revenue from a carbon tax 
is recycled to help the economy, through a reduction in taxes on labour (e.g. income tax or 
social insurance contributions). The importance of this finding is that it illustrates the fact that 
climate change policies can undermine the economy unless, that is, by reducing labour costs 
they address the setback to Ireland’s competitiveness. Subsequent work has had to allow for the 
fact that the range of application of carbon taxes was reduced when the sectors with large 
emitters joined the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (see below). But as both measures are 
basically a means of pricing emissions, the logical approach is to relate the two prices by, for 
example, setting the tax annually at the permits futures price, suitably constrained to impart 
stability. 
 
Using the revenues to subsidise energy efficiency projects meets with popular approval, but 
needs to avoid the problems associated with subsidies, discussed below. In particular, the cost 
per tonne abated through this route needs to be explicit. Forcing utilities to direct the revenues, 
or “indirect revenues” from windfall gains due to the EU emissions trading scheme, to such 
projects has the added difficulty of incompatible incentives. The utility has a long term interest 
in increasing energy sales, not decreasing them. Using gains to reduce energy prices, thereby 
reducing the carbon price, similarly runs counter to policy objectives. 
 
The evidence from other European countries shows that environmental taxation, of which 
carbon taxation is one example, can have a positive impact on economic growth and 
competitiveness (Andersen and Ekins, 2009). The COMETR research project, funded by the 
European Commission, found that the introduction of carbon or energy taxes with revenue 
recycling in Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland had a positive effect on 
GDP compared with the counterfactual reference case of no environmental tax reform 
(European Commission, 2007b).24 The effect was neutral in the case of the United Kingdom 
(see Figure 2). These results are all the more significant, given that the introduction of carbon 
taxes in these six countries was at a very modest level. As the European Commission points out, 
competitiveness is not only an economic but also environmental concern, because the migration 
of polluting industries to countries with lower standards would not reduce global emissions. The 
COMETR research project found that in the six EU Member States that have carried out green 
tax reforms, “carbon leakage” (which is the displacement of the emitting industry from one 
geographical area to one with lax policy, dubbed a “pollution haven”, with no resulting 
reduction in global emissions) has been very small and in some cases negative (Barker et al, 
                                                 
24 Slovenia was included in this study, though the country only implemented environmental tax reform in a limited 
way. 
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forthcoming). In so far as Ireland’s economic competitors in the European Union also introduce 
such fiscal measures, this would further diminish any harmful effects that a domestic carbon tax 
might have on Ireland’s competitiveness, given that most of Ireland’s trading competitors are 
based within the European Union. 
 
Figure 2: The effect of environmental tax reform 
Effect on GHG emissions    Effect on GDP 
  
Source: COMETR, 2007; Barker et al., 2009. 
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An important issue is the effect of carbon taxes on low-income households. Carbon taxation 
would indeed have more adverse impacts on individuals and sectors that consume above-
average amounts of energy or are very dependent on solid fuels, the most harmful sectors. 
According to the COMETR project, the sectors most vulnerable to a carbon tax would be basic 
metals and paper and pulp industries, whereas cement is relatively unaffected. But one of the 
points of such a tax is to provide a long-term signal that could encourage people, where 
possible, to choose less carbon-intensive lifestyles and investments. Moreover, the revenues 
collected can be recycled to help households that are disproportionately affected by the increase 
in fuel prices. This only requires a modest share of the revenues to be set aside for this purpose 
(Scott & Eakins 2004, 13; Callan et al, 2008). 
 
Another perceived disadvantage of carbon taxation is that some sectors – particularly transport – 
are relatively insensitive to price rises due to low elasticity of demand, especially if there are 
few alternatives to present modes of operating leading to potentially increased costs and little 
reduction in emissions. Nevertheless, a predictable price signal is likely to have an effect on 
energy demand in such sectors, as seen recently in the United States, and more so in the long 
term. The US Congressional Budget Office (2008) reported that gasoline price rises in 2008 
resulted in responses “large enough to interrupt a pattern of steady growth in gasoline 
consumption dating back to 1990, the last time US gasoline prices rose substantially”. During 
2003 to 2006 motorists already adjusted their driving habits (making fewer trips and driving 
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more slowly). After increasing steadily for more than 20 years, the market share of light trucks 
(including SUVs) began to decline in 2004. Persisting high prices are expected to cause 
inefficient vehicles to be replaced with fuel-efficient ones. 
 
The generation of additional revenue is a pivotal difference between a carbon tax on the one 
hand and high energy prices caused by external factors on the other. Another difference is that 
higher energy prices due to a rise in the price of crude oil promote development of polluting 
fuels such as tar sands. The effectiveness of a carbon tax will depend on accompanying 
measures, especially for activities with high emissions and a low sensitivity to price increases. 
Regulations, in the form of sound planning rules, parking constraints and investment in public 
transport are some other recommended measures. Concern that transport would still be “too 
high” reflects perhaps that other damages are not properly addressed,25 along the lines 
suggested in Efficient Transport for Europe – Policies for Internalisation of External Costs 
(ECMT, now the International Transport Forum, 1998). 
                                                
 
3.2.2 Emissions trading 
Emissions trading allows overall emissions from a sector or economy to be reduced by a certain 
specified amount at minimum cost to the economy. This is because each participating firm can 
choose to do what is cheapest for it, whether that is to reduce its emissions or purchase 
additional permits, depending on the price. In a cap-and-trade scheme a cap is set across the 
economy or economic sector. Permits are allocated to participating firms according to a division 
of the overall cap, and firms are obliged to restrain their emissions to their allocation of permits 
or else purchase additional permits. In this way the regulator creates a scarcity that in turn 
creates a carbon price depending on demand and the cost of abatement. There are many design 
options that will affect the performance and equity of an emissions trading scheme, including 
the method of allocation (e.g. by auctioning or on the basis of some previous level, called 
grandparenting), the penalties for non-compliance, the definition of participating entities and the 
point at which emissions are controlled. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (discussed below) 
controls emissions at a mid-point of the economy – large-scale industrial users of energy. An 
alternative approach would be to control emissions at the point of energy production or 
importation (“upstream”) or at the point of individual energy consumption (“downstream”). An 
upstream system with auctioned permits works like a carbon tax, in that the price of permits 
(being valuable “inputs”) is passed onto consumers. The difference is that the rate of the “tax” is 
variable and not automatically predictable as, given the cap, it depends on abatement costs. 
 
25 Including those due to perverse subsidies. It goes without saying that the objectives of any subsidies awarded to 
fuels can probably be achieved by other means. 
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Because there are quite few entities to control (refineries, fuel importers), an upstream system is 
relatively cheap and simple to administer. A downstream system is more complex to administer, 
with higher transaction costs and more regulated entities. 
3.2.1 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
Ireland participates in EU Emissions Trading Scheme for greenhouse gases. This scheme began 
operating in 2005 and controls emissions mid-stream, that is, from large-scale fixed-source 
emitters, such as large industrial units and power-generating stations (European Union, 2004). It 
covers about 45 percent of EU greenhouse gas emissions (29 percent of Irish emissions) but 
omits sectors like transport and agriculture. The current trading scheme runs until 2012 and the 
post-2012 scheme is currently being reviewed.  
 
A problem is that permits in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme have been allocated almost 
entirely by grandparenting, which gives permits to firms for free depending on their historical 
performance.26 Granting permits for free instead of requiring firms to buy them on the market 
was intended as a way of generating the political support for the scheme, but it has led to some 
perverse outcomes. First, grandparenting can reward firms with poor environmental records, 
since they are likely still to have low-cost abatement opportunities that other firms may have 
already exploited (indeed grandparenting may encourage poor environmental standards). This 
issue can be addressed by benchmarking allocations against an appropriate performance 
standard that has to be established. Second, allocation for free creates an incentive for firms to 
lobby for the most generous possible allocation. Over-generous allocation in the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme contributed to considerable volatility in the permit price: the sharp fall in the 
price of permits (from €29.90 in April 2006 to €12 in May 2006), triggered by the release of 
data showing a surplus in the market, reflected overly generous allocations by some EU member 
states to their polluting industries (Convery & Redmond 2007). The price was around €24 
(September 2008) falling to a price in the region of €10 by February 2009.27 Such volatility 
undermines the benefit of the price signal provided by a carbon market. Third, grandparenting 
creates something close to a free property right that firms will not want to relinquish in the 
future. This is a right to use of the atmosphere, and it is similar to other such rights. The 
experience of milk quotas and taxi and liquor licences in Ireland shows how politically difficult 
it can be to change a system in which government-created scarcity increases the value of 
                                                 
26 During the pilot phase, Member States were allowed to auction up to 5 percent of their total allowance allocation. 
Only Ireland, Denmark, Hungary and Lithuania have exercised this option to any extent (Convery & Redmond 
2007). Ireland auctioned 1 percent of its allocations under the first National Allocation Plan. Despite the apparent 
success of this exercise, only 0.5 percent of Ireland’s allocations are being auctioned under the second National 
Allocation Plan (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/nap_tables_ireland.pdf) 
27 http://www.pointcarbon.com  
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permits and thereby provides an incentive to the permit holder to resist socially beneficial 
change to the permit system. Grand-parenting benefits incumbents, to the disadvantage of 
potential new entrants and even clean technologies. Fourth, freely allocated permits that can be 
sold, or where their value can be realised through raising prices to consumers, provide an 
effective subsidy to emitting firms. This is the case in the power generation sector, where firms 
are able to pass through prices to consumers (FitzGerald and Tol 2007). It may also be a 
problem in the aviation and maritime transport sectors, if they are granted emission permits for 
free. For air travel some other instruments could be considered, e.g. an integrated EU air traffic 
control system (which would reduce emissions), a carbon tax or (ultimately) full auctioning of 
permits in an emission trading scheme. 
3.2.2 The case for placing limits on ETS prices  
In an emissions trading scheme, volatility in the permit price for CO2 emissions creates 
uncertainty for producers and complicate their investment decisions. If they feel that there is a 
risk that prices will fall, they will fear that their investment in clean technology could become 
unviable. They may feel inclined to invest more effort investigating a deal on fuel price than on 
potential abatement technologies.28 We saw that, for a given number of permits available, the 
market price in the EU ETS at any particular time reflects the carbon abatement cost. 
Fluctuations are to be expected depending on the changing circumstances of many agents. A 
case has been made by Helm for containing the price variation by imposing a floor and a ceiling 
on permits prices (Helm, 2008b). Not just a help to investors and a guard against a public 
backlash during oil price spikes, such a proposal has an economic rationale. It would enable the 
price to be tailored towards the social cost of carbon and stabilise prices. When or if full 
auctioning of permits replaces grandparenting such stability will be all the more attractive.  
 
A predicable and credible carbon price helps decisions on all sides of the market and 
particularly decisions on emissions reduction. A minimum carbon price would increase 
certainty about the long-term value of investments to reduce emissions (US GAO, 2008a). The 
likely profile of prices in the medium-term is currently far from clear, when one considers that 
entry of new countries into emissions trading in the 2012-2020 period could involve some over-
generous allocations of permits (called “hot air”). An expectation that permit prices will fall 
discourages abatement including recycling, is especially discouraging to long-lived investments, 
and volatility in general imposes a real cost. Futures markets can dispel volatility only to a 
limited extent in a regime that is anyway subject to periodic updates.  
 
                                                 
28 As found by Sorrell et al..  
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A floor price that bears a relationship to the social cost of carbon could remove such 
uncertainty, and thereby remove the bouts of price discouragement to research into renewables 
and low-carbon technologies. A ceiling in its turn would mean that CO2 intensive industries 
would feel less incentive to relocate. Furthermore any energy price shocks to the EU, whether 
induced by external events or internal shortages, that increased reliance on coal with 
concomitant demand-induced rise in the price of permits, could strain the will to maintain the 
system. This would especially apply before clean coal technologies in the form of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) became available. The floor and ceiling prices would be applied at 
EU level. 
 
A link between oil prices and carbon prices is already found in public discussion and the 
media.29 There is higher resistance to carbon charges when oil prices are high. Indeed when 
high oil prices depress profits, the carbon abatement cost from reducing output, in terms of 
foregone profits, is low. Or expressed differently, at high oil prices, the price of carbon does not 
need to be very high to entice producers to reduce their emissions. Conversely, other things 
being equal, when oil prices are low profits are high, and altering the level of activity to reduce 
emissions sees large foregone profits. The carbon price would then need to be high to entice 
producers to reduce their emissions. We are talking in terms of these actions relative to each 
other. The implications are that the floor and ceiling on the permit price should be indexed 
inversely to the oil price. This would suit both producers and households (Helm, 2008b). 
 
The means by which the floor price could be ensured are apparently straightforward. When the 
permit price falls below the floor a carbon tax could chip in to make up the difference. Another 
route would be for governments to buy back permits to raise their price, like central banks’ open 
market operations, or ”carbon market operations” in this case. If the permit price rose above the 
ceiling price, a negative carbon tax (a rebate) could chip in. Among other possibilities is the 
option of allowing more CDM projects from developing countries. The broadening of the EU 
ETS requires consideration of such facilities in any event. Linkages with trading schemes in 
other world blocks could be complicated by the imposition of limits, and by floor prices in 
particular if governments guarantee to buy permits. The scope for gaming would need to be 
addressed. 
 
                                                 
29 Keenan, 2008, in the Irish Independent put it thus: “To will the end, but not the means, is a common human 
condition… No one should have any doubt that dearer petrol, electricity, etc. is indeed the means by which carbon 
emissions will be cut. The question is whether governments should try to smooth what could otherwise be a highly 
disruptive series of booms and busts in both oil prices and economies.” See also Gibbons, 2008.  
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3.2.3 Individual carbon trading 
Individual carbon trading provides a form of emissions trading applied at the level of the 
individual: the ultimate expression of a downstream approach to a cap-and-trade emissions 
trading scheme. Individual carbon trading is based on the idea that the Earth’s atmosphere is a 
common resource and each individual is entitled to an equal share of the benefits, that is, the 
benefits of being able to engage in activities like driving and heating that use the atmosphere’s 
waste assimilation service. Under individual carbon trading everyone is given a limited 
allowance to cause CO2 emissions, thereby allowing total emissions to be controlled while 
giving people an incentive – through the price signal and the ability to sell any unused emission 
permits – to reduce their emissions in their everyday consumer decisions. Everyone would be 
given an initial allowance, with the information stored centrally and perhaps on an individual 
credit card, and they would be required to retire equivalent credits whenever they make a 
carbon-emitting purchase, such as for petrol. The overall cap could be tightened over time and 
the price of individual emission permits would rise according to demand, or fall as cheaper 
technical solutions to abatement emerged. 
 
Several models have been proposed with various design approaches to the practical issues posed 
by individual carbon trading, including tradable energy quotas, domestic tradable quotas and 
personal carbon allowances (Roberts & Thumin 2006, 12-14). There are many uncertainties 
related to the political acceptability and economic impacts of such a scheme and to its 
administrative complexity. “Cap and Share”, a proposal developed by the Irish think tank 
Feasta, is a comparable approach to individual carbon trading but with a more upstream focus 
that requires fossil-fuel suppliers, rather than households, to surrender permits corresponding to 
their fuels supplied. Each resident or household receives an annual “entitlement” to an equal 
share of the overall cap in the form of certificates. Households can sell the certificates via an 
intermediary (banks or post offices) for selling on to fossil-fuel suppliers. These suppliers are in 
turn obliged to buy entitlements equivalent to the emissions from the fuels that they supply 
(Feasta, 2007). Unlike the individual carbon trading schemes outlined above, in Cap and Share 
the resident is not obliged to purchase additional entitlements if his or her annual activities 
cause additional emissions. Rather, the system causes the scarcity to lead to higher fuel prices 
(since the suppliers will pass on the cost of certificates via the cost of fuel to consumers), with 
the result that average users sell their entitlement for the same amount as their annual energy 
bills rise. Those who consume less energy than average will be better off, and those who 
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consume more energy than the average will be worse off.30 In this way the system acts like a 
carbon tax with a variable rate, with the revenues recycled via the intermediary to consumers.  
 
The advantage of Cap and Share is that it could be effective, simple to administer and (perhaps) 
politically acceptable. Because fossil-fuel importers or refiners are small in number and are 
currently covered by the excise duty regime, they can be easily monitored, so administration 
costs would be low. Fossil-fuel importers will then pass on the additional cost of buying permits 
to consumers in the form of higher fuel prices. All consumers are incentivised to use less, and 
although this effect may be small in the short-term if the elasticity of demand is low (see 
above), the longer-term effect may be strong if the annual cap is seen to be enforceable and 
increasingly restrictive in a predictable way. The scheme could be politically acceptable because 
the revenue goes via the intermediary to residents and not to the government.  
 
A criticism of the Cap and Share proposal is that recycling the revenues to individuals fails to 
“compensate the economy”. The economy is disadvantaged by the high carbon price. This can 
be more than overcome by directing revenues instead to reduce labour costs (by reducing social 
insurance contributions and income taxes) and thereby helping competitiveness, rather than 
using all revenue from taxes or auctioning to compensate households (Bergin et al, 2004; 
Conefrey et al 2008).31 There is also the risk that the scheme could allow rent-seeking 
behaviour if fuel suppliers are able to hoard fuel and sell for a profit during times of scarcity. 
Finally, any possible transaction costs should be factored into the design of the scheme: the 
experience of the all-island electricity market shows that transaction costs can generate large 
and unforeseen expense that could undermine the efficiency of the scheme. In terms of 
environmental effectiveness, an area where Cap and Share (and other individual carbon trading 
schemes) could be considered is for the transport sector, where carbon taxes might be a 
politically unpopular way to reduce emissions. A point to note is that abatement costs in 
transport vary widely between persons, whereas each tonne of CO2 is equally damaging. If 
reducing emissions from transport is relatively costly its priority drops in the ranked list of 
abatement actions. However superior policies may be available, including justified provisions of 
public transport and other measures such as improved spatial planning. 
                                                 
30  This is not strictly the case in the version analysed by Cambridge Econometrics (2008). The scheme covers the 
whole non-ETS sector, which includes businesses as well as households. The businesses in the version modelled by 
Cambridge Econometrics, while paying the carbon price on fuels, do not receive certificates in compensation. 
Meanwhile all households rather than just average households appear to gain (Table 4.7). This is because they are 
receiving the businesses’ share of certificates. However, the carbon price passed on by businesses will erode some 
of the household sector’s seeming gain, and the businesses themselves could be at a disadvantage. 
31 Under the carbon levy only a share of revenue would be used and targeted at vulnerable households (Scott and 
Eakins, 2004, Callan et al, 2008). 
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3.2.4 User pricing (transport sector)  
The effectiveness of carbon taxation, at least in the short term, will be minimal where the price 
elasticity of demand is low. A prominent example in Ireland’s case is transport. Road transport 
is already heavily taxed in Ireland, as elsewhere in Europe: German excise duty on petrol in 
2006 was the equivalent of €275.20/tonne CO2 equivalent (Convery & Redmond, 2007; Parry 
and Small, 2005). This is a multiple of carbon trading levels, although it should be noted that 
transport not only burns fuel but also imposes other external costs of road use (including air 
pollution, road wear, water-course pollution, severance of habitat, not to mention congestion 
and noise). There is a low elasticity of demand for private motor transport in the short term.32 
An additional carbon tax of, say, €20/tonne CO2, which would add just 4.22% to the price of 
petrol (2006 figures), would therefore most likely not have a discernible impact on demand for 
travel and might bring few short-term benefits, whatever about the long-term effect, which 
could be significant.  
 
A more effective approach to transport emissions could be to charge all modes of transport 
directly, that is, as they drive, according to their total external social, economic and 
environmental costs, as recommended in recent reports to the UK and Irish governments.33 
Possible demand-side measures include congestion pricing and road pricing. A national road-
pricing scheme that would charge users per kilometre driven, depending on location and time of 
day, is actively under consideration in the Netherlands with a view to nationwide 
implementation by 2016.34  
 
3.2.5 Border Tax Adjustments 
The threat to competitiveness from cheap “dirty” imports and fears about carbon leakage due to 
industries relocating abroad are often raised as objections to charges on carbon emissions. 
Under “free” trade, polluting industries that are subject to domestic carbon charges could be 
drawn to countries with lax environmental policies. These countries offer what amounts to a 
comparative advantage, in the form of “havens” for polluters. Other policies, for example direct 
standards such as emission standards, have cost implications too and thus affect 
competitiveness. 
 
                                                 
32 It is sometimes claimed mistakenly that high prices at present ‘show’ that price has no effect, without regard to 
what demand would have been. In addition, elasticities are sometimes understated. Price-induced technological 
improvements are not unlearned in price downturns and this can reduce the measured price-demand effect. 
33 Eddington Transport Study (2006) and Oscar Faber (2000). 
34 “Road-use charge to reduce Dutch traffic jams”. Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 1 December 2007. 
http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/071201-dutch-traffic-mc 
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Where revenues from carbon charges have been recycled to reduce other taxes, the effects need 
not be harmful at national level (see above, the COMETR study and ex ante analyses of carbon 
taxes (Conefrey et al., 2008)). Nevertheless, a few energy-intensive sectors, those revealed as 
having limited market power because they trade at world level, require special attention. It 
would be pointless to cause such sectors to flee, only to set up abroad and continue polluting. 
Several studies have found statistically significant, though minor, pollution haven effects. 
Others have produced inconclusive results,35 which is not surprising given the difficulty of 
disentangling the many factors, including proximity to growing markets, that influence location 
decisions. Such mixed findings highlight the desirability of inducing host countries, via 
agreements, to strengthen their environmental policies, and of co-ordinating global 
environmental rules (Waldkirch and Gopinath, 2004). 
 
Border Tax Adjustments are one possible solution, if permitted. They would consist of a tax on 
the pollution generated in making imports coming into Ireland. By subjecting these imports to 
the same level of carbon taxes that were imposed in Ireland, the playing field is levelled. 
Similarly Ireland’s exports to those countries are at a disadvantage owing to the carbon prices 
levied here in the course of their manufacture, and they would receive an adjustment on export 
in the form of a tax relief or rebate. Such adjustments to the price at borders would apply to a 
few highly carbon-intensive sectors that trade on the world market and are revealed to be price-
takers. Sectors such as cement that tend not to be price-takers may not need protection by border 
tax adjustments while steel, for example, would need protection of some sort (HM Treasury, 
2006; Fitz Gerald et al, 2009). The vast bulk of sectors are not sufficiently affected by charges 
on carbon to impact on their competitiveness. 
 
A border tax for Ireland would not be applied unilaterally but as part of an EU-wide 
application.36 It would be levied on vulnerable sector products from countries that do not take 
part in an emissions trading scheme or do not put a price or other obligation on their producers 
to reduce carbon emissions. The justification would be that countries without commensurate 
measures in place are using the earth’s atmosphere as if it were a free sink, like having a 
subsidised environmental service. Such countries might furthermore be characterised as free-
riding on the efforts of others to help the climate. An international carbon tax or a cap & trade 
                                                 
35 Studies supporting the pollution haven hypothesis, if to a small degree, are seen in papers by Levinson (1996), 
van Beers and van den Bergh (1997), List and Co (2000), Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor 
(2004). Studies showing that environmental policies had a favourable impact on competitiveness include papers by 
Berman and Bui (1999) and Kind et al., (2002). 
36 The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the customs union. External tariffs are set by the European Union rather 
than the Member States and there can be no tariffs on intra-EU trade, and thus no border tax adjustments either. 
Note that the bulk of Irish imports and exports are from and to other EU countries. 
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scheme with auctioned permits operating at world level, with general withholding of revenues 
by the countries, would remove much concern about competitiveness effects. 
 
Border Tax Adjustments have already been applied in the US in the form of environmental 
excise taxes. A relevant instance was the Ozone-Depleting Chemicals Tax. This tax aimed to 
harness market forces in finding substitutes for the taxed chemicals, and their production was 
apparently discouraged by the tax in an effective manner (Zhang and Baranzini, 2004). 
 
The issue hinges on whether such Border Tax Adjustments for carbon charges would comply 
with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) under the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). According to the rules, as long as there is no discrimination, the same 
taxes as those applied domestically can be imposed on like imported products, and a rebate of 
taxes can be awarded on exported domestic products. This kind of border tax reflects the 
application of the destination principle to products: products should be taxed in the country 
where they are consumed and not in the country where they are produced, unless they are also 
consumed there. Clearly, such adjustments are intended to ensure that internal taxes on products 
are trade-neutral.37 The situation is more complex when the imported good is not the item that is 
taxed, but the energy or carbon emissions associated with the good’s production are taxed. 
These are the emissions that are embodied or embedded, or the virtual emissions, in the product. 
To level the playing field, the energy or carbon embodied in the production of the imported 
steel, say, would need to be ascertained and verified – and the tax would need to be the same as 
on domestically produced steel.  
 
The OECD argues that Border Tax Adjustments should be used as a last resort only, because 
BTAs could violate WTO rules and may lead to trade retaliation. For now, the OECD 
recommends that the focus be on achieving participation by all major emitting countries and 
sectors in an international agreement on emission reduction (Gurría, 2008). The European 
Commission likewise suggests exploring the options for allaying the competitive disadvantage 
of charges on carbon. The Commission cites possible internal or external solutions. An internal 
solution could entail differentiating the instrument applied to the vulnerable sector, among other 
possibilities. For example carbon-intensive sectors could continue to receive free allowances. A 
possible disadvantage there is that entities could sell the allowances and relocate anyway and 
therefore agreements would need to be reached, perhaps with technical upgrades thrown in (US 
                                                 
37 This too has a precedent in the US with the Superfund Tax that was designed to place the burden of chemical 
clean-up in the US on those responsible for generating the wastes. Tax rates based on the US production was 
adopted by the US Secretary of the Treasury as the approach for the tax on imported chemicals (Zhang and 
Baranzini, 2004.). 
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GAO, 2008b). With respect to possible external solutions, important elements that need to be 
resolved include WTO compatibility, retaliation, and the energy and carbon efficiency. The 
Commission notes that investments being made in emerging economies, often by European 
companies, could in any event be using state of the art clean technology. If no global agreement 
is reached for a post-2012 framework the EU might consider the possible use of border tariffs to 
equalise the effective “tax” on carbon in traded goods coming into and exported out of Europe. 
It will make proposals, at the latest by 2011 (Delbeke, 2008). However, as a substantial part of 
carbon emissions are not priced by a straight-forward tax but by a cap-and-trade system with 
some free permits, any border tax adjustment is likely to be challenged as being discriminatory. 
Much work would need to be done to flesh out these arrangements, but in the view of Nordhaus 
(2007) carbon tax and border adjustments are familiar terrain because countries have dealt with 
problems of tariffs, subsidies, and differential tax treatment for many years. “The (tax) issues 
are elementary compared to those of a quantity-based regime” he adds.  
 
The practicalities of border tax adjustments are briefly described as follows. According to one 
proposal, the level of tax on an imported product could be calculated as the additional costs of 
carbon permits incurred on procurement during production of the domestic equivalent product, 
using best available technology (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2004). The proposers claim that this would 
limit possible distortions and could be compatible with WTO constraints. They say that the 
crucial features are simplicity, which would be achieved by focusing on the CO2 emissions 
caused by processed materials and a separate treatment of electric energy input to take account 
of regionally varying fuel mixes. Of course, the tax is less clear when the imports embody 
carbon that has been permitted for free in a cap & trade system. There is another uncertainty 
relating to the requirement that all “like” products be treated the same. If “like” applies to the 
final product, countries with carbon-intensive exports facing taxes on their embodied carbon 
might claim discrimination, which is why the destination principle is the easier approach.   
 
For Ireland, once these issues were settled such calculations of embodied carbon can be made 
by looking at the supply chain using Input-Output analysis, as reported in the section on trends, 
above. 
 
In addition to arguing that a border tax can be compliant with GATT as in the suggested version 
above, Weber and Peters point to a second avenue that a country might use. That is, a country 
might simply admit that the border tax is incompatible with GATT and claim an exception 
through Article XX of GATT.  Exceptions for environmental reasons are allowed. The article 
states that measures relating to “conservation of natural resources” or out of necessity to 
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“protect human, animal, or plant life or health” are allowed if they are made in parallel with 
similar actions domestically (World Bank, 2007; Weber and Peters, 2009). The two precedents 
here have been controversial. Article XX was successfully used to block Canadian exports of 
asbestos intensive construction materials to France, and to block imports of shrimp to the US 
that had been caught by using nets that were harming turtles. If other WTO members were 
attempting to pass measures on climate policy that would invoke Article XX it may be easier to 
prove legality (Weber and Peters, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, the optimal solution for potential conflicts between WTO members would be to 
make the adjustment unnecessary. The harmonization of emissions pricing across countries 
would eliminate grounds for border tax adjustments in the first place. Logically the WTO 
should be rectifying the absence of carbon price (or similar), which, as already stated, 
effectively constitutes a subsidy for exports and an unfair practice, a description forcefully 
employed by Stiglitz (2006).38 Such an internationally harmonized approach seems unlikely for 
now. 
 
In the absence of a harmonized international price then, the second-best option for the members 
of the Kyoto coalition and its successor, might be to enact border adjustments for their current 
and future energy tax schemes vis-à-vis countries that do not enter the next agreement. Despite 
legal ambiguities and uncertainties, world trade law would most probably permit such actions 
(Biermann and Brohm, 2005).  
 
Alternatively, Weber and Peters suggest that in the short-term “the effectiveness of using the 
global trade network as a “carrot”, through technology sharing, collaborative research, global 
sectoral agreements, and freeing trade in environmental goods, may outweigh the effectiveness 
of coercive “sticks”. They seem to imply that many sectors and not just carbon-intensive sectors 
would be affected and, in contrast to Stiglitz, they highlight the methodological and 
confidentiality concerns arising in calculating the carbon embodied in the vulnerable goods (i.e. 
primary goods apart). More importantly, they stress the present need to engage all countries in 
policy and, with self-serving behaviour in evidence, the mere perceived intent of border taxes 
may deter co-operation overall. Efforts to achieve such co-operation, they suggest, should 
                                                 
38  While the US was refusing to sign up to action on climate change, Stiglitz argued for a global enforcement 
mechanism, involving import prohibition or border taxes, to prevent any country from inflicting harm on the rest of 
the world. Citing the precedents, he stated that the principle that global environmental concerns could trump narrow 
commercial interests was sustained by the WTO. Veenendaal and Manders (2008) meanwhile show that Stiglitz’s 
proposal is unlikely to be effective as an enforcement mechanism. Though mitigating the generally modest negative 
effects of unilateral climate policy by the EU, the pain inflicted on non-EU regions by border trade measures would 
“not seem to be effective in persuading non-abating countries to join a climate change regime”. 
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include improving accounting for the carbon inventories by using the consumption based 
approach (for international transport included), or extending emissions trading-cum-CDM to 
bottom-up approaches, such as global sectoral agreements. (But note this could reduce the 
benefits of simplified targets, discussed above under the section on international project 
mechanisms.) In addition to massive amounts of capital to finance diffusion of green 
technologies, reduction of barriers to diffusion are also called for by the authors. They say this 
is not to deny the role of carbon tariffs in avoiding non-compliance in climate change mitigation 
policy in the long term. But the benefits of global co-operation are large and border taxes should 
not be allowed to impede it in any way. 
3.3 Standards and regulations 
 
The use of direct government intervention through technical measures – such as regulations 
mandating appliance efficiency levels or the use of specific technologies – is often a cruder 
instrument than incentive-based measures. The state may be guided by political preferences 
rather than questions of economic efficiency or effectiveness when it chooses a particular 
technology as a response to climate change; governments are often poor predictors of 
technologies, simply because they are not omniscient. Technological developments would 
benefit from a guaranteed price of emissions, as technology has been bedevilled by uncertain 
carbon price up until now. Nevertheless, there are many cases that call for direct government 
intervention or a mixture of instruments rather than leaving things to the market, especially in 
cases of clear market failure. For example, there are economies of scale in the provision of 
information in the area of energy consumption. Savings are possible but many opportunities for 
reduced consumption remain hidden or otherwise unexploited. Reduced demand for energy or 
carbon-intensive fuels will be essential if Ireland is to move towards its long-term target (Fitz 
Gerald et al, 2008).  
 
3.3.1 Energy efficiency 
Energy efficiency provides much scope for reducing emissions according to the estimate that at 
least 20 percent of energy in the European Union is wasted (European Commission 2006). The 
European Commission has defined an Action Plan with about 75 measures that can be taken to 
increase energy efficiency in appliances, buildings, electricity generation and the transport 
sector. Ireland could exploit some of these measures aggressively where they are the lowest-cost 
opportunities for reducing emissions. The energy saving potential of buildings in the European 
Union is estimated at 28 percent and there is particular scope for savings in the public sector, 
where users of buildings generally do not have the incentive to use energy efficiently.  
 34
Early action on energy efficiency could be worthwhile, e.g. through the unilateral imposition of 
efficiency standards up to the cost-effective limit39 for all buildings, regardless of size. Other 
measures include incentives for the development of passive houses, which rely on very good 
insulation levels and passive heating and mechanical ventilation rather than traditional heating 
systems, as well as measures to raise the efficiency of energy transformation, for instance by 
promoting Combined Heat and Power and district-heating schemes in urban areas. In addition, 
the appraisal of infrastructure projects such as foreseen under Transport 21 and the new 
Programme for Government should involve cost-benefit analysis to take into account the 
external costs and benefits of proposed projects including their impact on greenhouse-gas 
emissions. The correct share of public transport infrastructure options needs to be assessed in 
this manner. 
 
3.3.2 Spatial planning 
Spatial planning and its consistent, effective implementation is a crucial policy area to address 
because of the long-term impact that settlement patterns will have on greenhouse gas emissions. 
This calls for a radical overhauling of Ireland’s planning regime, which has to date led to the 
haphazard development of rural and peri-urban areas, and in turn has locked a growing 
proportion of the population into energy-intensive commuting patterns. Higher density need not 
imply unsightly heavy-handed developments, provided that they are designed with communities 
in mind (European Environment Agency, 2006).  
 
3.3.3 Electricity generation from renewable sources 
The Programme for Government foresees that at least one third of electricity consumed in 
Ireland will be generated from renewable sources by 2020 (Government of Ireland 2007b, 16). 
This target is both ambitious and important if Ireland is going to meet its national emission 
targets. Political predictability is needed in this area because of the long investment horizon of 
the sector: generating stations typically have lifespans of about 20 years or more and 
distribution networks have lifespans of about 45 years (Deloitte & Touche 2005, 8). 
 
Ireland has enormous and largely untapped resources of renewable energy. A 1997 study 
estimated that wind power could generate around 345 TWh per year, about 19 times the current 
electricity production of the ESB system, with the cost rising with the extent of penetration 
(ESBI/ETSU 1997). The recent grid study40 shows that the type of grid is significantly different 
                                                 
39 Costing in the external costs and benefits, as by Brophy et al., 1999. 
40  http://www.eirgrid.com/EirGridPortal/uploads/Announcements/EirGrid%20GRID25.pdf 
 35
and more expensive if 6000 MW, rather than 4000 MW, of wind is to be accommodated. In the 
short-term, however, the potential of renewable energy will not be realised without government 
support. Many new renewable energy technologies are relatively expensive because they are in 
their infancy. The structure of the electricity grid itself also imposes barriers to the wider 
deployment of renewable electricity. Irish electricity is structured around a number of large 
base-load plants, mainly combined-cycle gas turbine. Such plant has high capital costs, runs 
continuously at high output and is well suited for providing the electricity market with a 
guaranteed minimum supply, but it is inefficient when operated at part load, and it is expensive 
to start up and shut down and therefore inflexible and unresponsive to fluctuating demands. 
According to some estimates, there is more than double the required amount of base-load plant 
in Ireland to satisfy minimum system demand (O’Connor 2006). This inappropriate generation 
mix has developed in response to rather crude market incentives rather than strategic planning.  
 
The government could facilitate high penetration of wind energy (e.g. 30 percent) by 
encouraging the deployment of open cycle gas turbine stations, which have a relatively low 
capital cost and provide the flexibility to balance the energy system when the wind drops 
(ESRI/EPA 2004, 17). The most important and long-term challenge, however, will be to 
reorient the grid itself to allow the accommodation of greatly increased amounts of dispersed, 
often small generators of electricity from renewable energy sources (SEI 2004, 20). 
“Embedded” or “distributed” generation is electricity generated in small-scale units that are 
connected to regional electricity distribution networks. Properly designed, a grid based on 
embedded generation could reduce greenhouse gases through improved efficiency and the 
accommodation of electricity from renewable sources while bringing additional benefits of 
improved security of supply, through fuel diversity and a more flexible grid that is less prone to 
blackouts (Goodbody Economic Consultants 2002, 70). In Ireland there is much potential for 
flexible and new technologies such as modular combined cycle gas turbine, open cycle gas 
turbine, combined heat and power (large-scale, mini and micro) and fuel cells to be included in 
a national system of distributed generation. Micro-generation, which includes such technologies 
as domestic solar panels, brings embedded generation closest to the point of use. Combined 
Heat and Power (CHP, or the simultaneous production of electricity and usable heat; also 
known as cogeneration) would likewise benefit from a restructured grid. Though not necessarily 
based on renewable energy sources, CHP could also reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
improving the efficiency of electricity conversion. The creation of a flexible electricity grid that 
accommodates major penetration of embedded generation will not happen without government 
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intervention, however. For instance, it is often impossible for technical reasons to connect 
micro-generation and small-scale electricity generation to the electricity network. 
 
A reorientation of the national grid to accommodate wide-spread renewable and micro-
generated electricity would allow a large increase in the penetration of low-carbon forms of 
electricity generation, including micro-generation. This depends on a strong policy of technical 
intervention by Government and the relevant authorities and is the subject of ongoing analysis. 
Such an intervention would not be to choose any specific technologies but rather to provide an 
environment in which many different kinds of technologies, including low-carbon ones, can 
compete. Such intervention could be justified because of the potential benefits and due to the 
national importance of the grid infrastructure. Short-term measures could include the 
introduction of a simplified protocol for connection to the grid and the introduction of smart 
metering, which would also promote energy efficiency by encouraging consumers to regulate 
their electricity consumption according to its price. Additional investment in interconnectors 
would also hedge against variability in output and allow Ireland to export as well as import 
electricity. In practice this can be less responsive depending on pricing arrangements which 
entail flows being determined one week ahead, for example. All these measures come at a cost. 
Nuclear power is unlikely to play a role in the generating mix without an equally strong 
government intervention, and a decision about any such intervention should be dependent on 
cost. Naturally nuclear energy should not be exempt from paying for its own particular external 
impacts such as end-of life, nuclear waste, monitoring and security costs that need to be factored 
in. Customers need to bear such costs (Helm, 2008c). The choice of fuel used to generate 
electric power will become more important with the increasing number of plug-in hybrids and 
all-electric cars on the Irish roads. If such cars are connected to a smart grid, their batteries 
could serve to stabilize power supply and allow for a greater penetration of variable and 
unpredictable energy sources such as wind, wave and solar power (DECNR, 2006). 
 
3.3.4 Nuclear energy (domestic and imported) 
For reasons of investor security and the risk (though small) of a radioactive accident, a nuclear 
power station could not be built without direct government financial support. To avoid 
inconsistent treatment of pollution, the costs of dealing with the waste and security would need 
to be factored in to the price of the electricity generated. Given that a nuclear power station 
takes about ten years to build, and no station has been proposed in Ireland, nuclear power is 
unlikely to play a significant role in Ireland’s electricity mix (apart from some imported 
electricity) for the foreseeable future. 
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A pertinent objection to nuclear power is that it is the opposite of the kind of plant that is needed 
for the Irish electricity system. Nuclear power is currently not very economic in units below 
700-800 megawatts, and its use would be limited to base-load plant, of which there is already a 
surfeit in Ireland (Bolger 2007; Lyons et al., 2007). There may also be a trade-off between a 
centralised system that is made up of a small number of large generating stations and a more 
flexible, decentralised system made up of a large number of small generating stations, many of 
which would be based on renewable resources like wind or biomass and would be closer to the 
point of electricity use, as described above (Mitchell and Woodman, 2006). Finally, it is 
necessary to examine nuclear power’s opportunity costs. Nuclear power is not currently cost 
competitive with other forms of electricity (although a 2003 MIT report suggested that nuclear 
power might be price competitive if the price of carbon rises to about $50-200/ton carbon: 
Ansolabehre, 2003) and generally requires direct or indirect public support. The benefits of 
spending public money on a nuclear power station should be compared to the gains to be 
achieved by investing in energy efficiency or in non–technology specific measures like 
promoting a decentralised grid that accommodates embedded generation from a variety of 
different technologies. (These comparisons are facilitated through estimates for the schedule of 
marginal abatement costs.) 
 
3.3.5 Carbon-intensive electricity generation: coal and peat 
Besides peat, coal produces the highest proportion of greenhouse gases of any fuel, and large 
users are regulated by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which puts a cost on carbon and 
raises their electricity prices. The replacement of Moneypoint generating station with a gas-fired 
station would improve environmental performance, but this option has been rejected by the 
Government to reduce over-reliance on gas and maintain diversity of energy supply. The 
environmental impact of coal could be reduced by CO2 sequestration (also known as carbon 
capture and storage), a technology that is still far from being cost effective at current carbon 
prices. Peat is an indigenous source of energy that provides local employment, but its extraction 
can destroy ecological habitats and it emits even more CO2 than coal. One solution would be to 
replace peat – and, eventually, other fuels – with biomass, which would retain the social 
benefits of local employment that are gained by using peat while also boosting the use of a 
renewable source of energy with fewer environmental impacts. However even supplying 30 per 
cent of the current fuel used in peat stations with biomass would be likely to entail large 
imports. 
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The future viability of coal as a generating fuel in a climate change context depends on a 
nascent technology known as carbon capture and storage (CCS). The feasibility of ambitious 
climate targets may depend on the successful development of CCS as a cost-effective way of 
dealing with carbon emissions from coal, given the massive share of global electricity that coal 
provides (half of all electricity generation in the United States comes from coal) and its likely 
role in the future, given large global coal stocks. CCS refers to any process by which the CO2 
from coal combustion is captured from point sources like power stations and large factories, 
compressed into liquid form, transported to a suitable location and placed in permanent storage. 
Subterranean geological features are considered suitable for storage for many centuries with 
minimal risk of seepage and it could be based on the decades-old practice of injecting liquid 
into petroleum fields to increase oil recovery. The problem today is that CCS is an experimental 
process based on a complex stream of processes many of which depend on infant technologies. 
Demonstration projects reveal that CCS costs between $50 and $100 per tonne of CO2 emitted; 
this adds between $0.04 and $0.08 to the price of a kilowatt hour of electricity (Fernando, et al., 
2008). CCS will therefore raise costs to consumers of electricity without providing any obvious 
co-benefits apart from reduced carbon emissions (the process of generating electricity by 
burning coal remains essentially unchanged). There may also be public resistance to CCS for 
several reasons including its cost, its “validation” of the continued use of coal for electricity 
generation, and the risks to ecosystems and human health from an accidental leakage of the 
captured CO2.  
 
To ensure that CCS is included in the panoply of policy and technology options available to 
address climate change there is a role for governments (including Ireland’s) to help develop and 
demonstrate the technologies necessary for CCS, and a large-scale mandatory CCS project 
could be set as a condition for the future continued operation of Moneypoint coal-burning 
power station. In general, however, the most appropriate approach will be to place a price on 
carbon emissions through taxation or an emissions trading scheme. The International Energy 
Agency predicts that the cost of CO2 capture could fall 50% by 2030 to $25-50 per tonne of 
CO2 (Fernando et al. 2008, 28). In the context of a carbon price this could make CCS an 
attractive option for investment. This should be a decision for private investors, not 
governments, but the Government does have a role to play in the meantime by helping CCS 
demonstrate its applicability (if indeed it can be applied at scale) through supporting R&D and 
demonstration. Crucially, the Government must also ensure that any CCS research or full-scale 
deployment in Ireland be bound by an appropriate regulatory regime that measures its 
performance as well as any impacts to ecosystems or human health. 
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3.3.6 Information 
Regulations are also needed to ensure information is delivered through such mechanisms as eco-
labelling to enable consumers to use their market power to reward green producers. Utilities in 
particular must make it possible for consumers to know what quantities they are buying and 
what costs they are incurring. Many barriers that deter would-be investors in energy efficiency 
can be overcome quite easily by the provision of reliable and relevant information Scott. 1997; 
Sorrell et al, 2004). 
3.4 Subsidies 
 
Subsidies are a way to attempt to secure a particular outcome by incentivising favoured 
technologies or practices. Carefully designed subsidies can succeed in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions if set in the right policy mix, but, precisely because they need to be carefully 
designed, they are prone to lead to unintended or suboptimal outcomes. Some subsidies are 
outright counterproductive in the context of climate policy, such as the requirement for Irish 
electricity producers to generate electricity from burning peat (one of the most carbon-intensive 
fuels). Some subsidies provide perverse incentives, like the subsidy on public transport through 
a rebated tax on its fuel rather than on what should be encouraged, namely, passenger numbers; 
aviation has also benefited from a preferential and poorly targeted41 tax treatment (Scott and 
Feeney, 1998). Subsidies are popular, however, because they give large benefits to small 
focused groups while dispersing the costs on society in general (Jaffe et al, 2005).  
 
Subsidies effectively make products or services cheaper than they would otherwise be. Direct 
subsidies are easy to observe and measure but indirect subsidies, which are less easy to define, 
have a significant impact. These include subsidies to production inputs, such as water, which is 
significantly underpriced in Ireland and encourages over-use and can give false signals to 
expand supply, with concomitant energy use. Although subsidies play a positive role in 
technology research and development is discussed in the next section, they tend to be quite 
technology-specific and can be misused.42 One major example is the set of subsidy structures in 
place for biofuels to help achieve target shares for their future use. EU subsidies to biofuels in 
2006 were an estimated €3.6 billion, through Common Agricultural Policy payments and other 
                                                 
41  This subsidy has now been removed. A targeted measure is one that is correctly applied at the point of decision 
to pollute or not to pollute (or as close as possible to it), e.g. whether or not to use another litre of water, petrol, or 
get a plastic bag etc. At this point the user can make a difference to the amount of tax they pay and the effect they 
have on the environment. 
42 The subsidy may be guided by estimates in the MAC, but the cost of abatement in individual cases is ultimately 
unknowable until tried. Sectors in the UK, threatened with a carbon price, in many cases abated far more than 
expected (Salmons, 2007). 
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measures. The Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (2008) estimate of global support for 
biodiesel and ethanol is US $12 billion in 2006. This is excluding the costs of the side effects of 
the policy of subsidising biofuels, in diverting food to fuel thereby exacerbating demand from 
an already hard-pressed food supply, and putting pressure on land. Similarly German subsidies 
to solar panels, via a feed-in electricity price, have raised the price of silicon, making solar 
panels expensive to install in more appropriate locations including Africa.43 Germany is not a 
natural location for solar electricity and while a “success” in terms of take-up and illustrating 
the power of price, it also risks upsetting the comparative advantage of wind energy, with the 
temptation for subsidy leap-frogging. Subsidy policies are used as a way to sidestep  addressing 
the real the culprit of global warming directly, namely, carbon emissions.  
 
In the absence of emissions pricing, subsidies to the adoption of new technology do not in 
themselves encourage reduced use of polluting technology. Furthermore they can benefit the 
very products that ought ideally to be discouraged, by helping marginal firms and even 
encouraging new entrants, thereby increasing pollution. They can require large public 
expenditure per unit of effect, since recipients who would have innovated anyway may also 
receive the subsidy (the free rider or additionality issue). Another problem arises with the 
revenue that must be raised to finance subsidies. Ireland’s targets are onerous to the extent of 
having potential macro-economic effects, but raising taxes to fund subsidies distorts the 
allocation of resources and moves the economy away from efficient allocation. The cost of the 
subsidy is not just its value, but the extra cost of providing a subsidy with public money. Studies 
for Ireland put the adjustment factor at well over 1 for multiplying the nominal cost to establish 
the true cost (Barrett, 1997; Honohan and Irvine, 1987). 
 
Notwithstanding the above, there is a role for subsidies in a well-designed policy mix. Cost-
effective technologies that are not widely installed could be suffering an information failure and 
subsidised energy audits that recommend energy-saving projects can help overcome this. A 
feed-in tariff for renewable electricity can drive the deployment of new technologies to help 
them achieve economies of scale, although the German example showed the danger of setting 
the subsidy too high. All the while systematic assessment of subsidy outcomes is recommended 
(Jaffe et al, 2005). In addition, public funds could be made available through grants (e.g. 
administered by Sustainable Energy Ireland), to direct investment in energy efficiency, 
renewable energy and low carbon emission projects, and also to provide a source of capital 
                                                 
43 “More heat than light”, The Economist, 7 April 2008. 
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10989479 
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available to banks and lending institutions to subsidise low-interest loans to companies that are 
seeking finance for projects to deliver low carbon or renewable.  
 
3.5 Research and development policy  
 
The market failure associated with the emissions externality has already been discussed, but the 
existence of a second market failure must be emphasised, which is summed up as the 
occurrence of knowledge spillovers. These spillovers are the results of investment in R&D and 
of learning by doing and information. These results are externalities, but of the positive kind, 
requiring market corrections, in the form of subsidies to R&D and production subsidies for 
demonstrating renewable energy to rectify their under-provision. The positive gains are often 
not captured by those who invest in the R&D (Bazilian et al., 2004; Morgenroth and Fitz 
Gerald, 2006; Ryan and Turton, 2007). In the UK a decline in R&D activity occurred with 
reforms to promote competition in the electricity sector, because the fruits of their investigations 
would now be shared by other parties (Scott and Evans, 2007). The resulting under-investment 
and lack of development and demonstration of new technology can be rectified by government 
subsidies. Investment in R&D itself may be doubly under-provided unless there are market 
corrections dealing with both externalities, which pay for the spillover benefits and put a value 
on technology’s output, namely, carbon reduction.  
 
Optimal correction of two such market failures requires more than one single policy and the 
issue of policy mix has received attention recently (Jaffe et al, 2005). In a study that assesses 
policies for reducing emissions and promoting renewable energy in the US electricity sector, 
Fischer and Newell (2008) find that due to knowledge spillovers, optimal policy performance 
involves a portfolio of different instruments. They judge optimality by various criteria: 
economic surplus,44 emissions reduction, renewable energy production and R&D. The authors 
find that an optimal portfolio of policies can achieve emissions reductions at a significantly 
lower cost than any single policy, although the reductions continue to be due primarily to the 
emissions price. In particular they show that an emissions price alone, although the least costly 
of the single policy levers, is significantly more expensive alone than when used in combination 
with optimal knowledge subsidy policies. Also the burden on consumers may be large if they do 
not benefit in some way from revenue transfers (a problem of granting permits for free as 
opposed to auctioning them, discussed under the section above on emissions trading). 
                                                 
44 The economic surplus is measured as the environmental benefits net of the sum of changes in consumer and 
producer surplus and revenue transfers from subsidies and taxes. 
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Importantly a renewables research subsidy on its own is the most costly single policy for 
reducing emissions, and a renewables output subsidy is the next most costly, though much less 
so.45 With the combination policy, the required emissions price is much more modest.  
 
Fischer and Newell point to some clear principles that emerge from their study. Under the 
ultimate goal of reducing emissions, policies that create incentives for fossil-fuelled generators 
to reduce emissions intensity, and for consumers to conserve energy, perform better than those 
that rely on incentives for renewable energy producers alone. A renewable energy R&D subsidy 
on its own turns out to be an inefficient means of emissions reduction, in so far as it postpones 
the majority of effort to displace fossil-fuelled generation until after costs are brought down by 
R&D.  In the absence of conservation incentives and emissions pricing in particular, it requires 
very large R&D investments and forgoing near-term cost-effective abatement opportunities. 
They state that their results emphasise the importance of policies that encourage abatement 
across all available forms and timeframes, as well as highlighting the limitations of narrowly 
targeted policies, particularly those focused solely on R&D.  
 
Research is a major area for state subsidies in Ireland, attracting €8.2 billion of funding in the 
2007-2013 National Development Plan. The establishment of the Irish Energy Research Council 
in 2006 establishes a strategy for research in the energy area, but Ireland has historically spent 
less, per capita, on research and development of renewable energy than its OECD peers (see 
Figure 3). Current policy is intended to develop a more competitive contribution from 
indigenous, and in particular, renewable energy sources as well as improvements in energy 
efficiency in transport, energy-supply systems, buildings and industry (Government of Ireland 
2006, 160). An example might be ocean energy from waves or tides, which is abundant around 
the island of Ireland and, because tidal power is predictable, could provide a backup source of 
energy to support wind power (DCMNR, 2005; SEI 2006, 10). To contain risk, the research 
needs to be shared with other countries and ought to include systematic updates of the known 
and expected comparative costs of emissions abated by different technologies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 The paper concentrates on the mid-term, but the authors point out that R&D focused on breakthrough 
technologies could have greater salience in the context of deeper long-term emissions reductions. 
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Figure 3: IEA member government budgets for total renewable energy R&D annual investments 
for 1974–2003 (left) and investment per capita, averaged between 1990 and 2003 (right). 
 
 
Source: Sims et al. (2007), 314, reproduced from International Energy Agency 
 
Regular reviews of the state research and development and its budget, foreseen under the 
National Development Plan, would help to maximise the synergies with Ireland’s climate-
change goals. Prioritised according to potential savings in abatement costs, research across a 
broad range of technologies can be promoted. One should keep in mind, however, that subsidies 
to R&D reward effort rather than success. R&D subsidies are therefore no substitute for a 
carbon price, which itself would also stimulate R&D. 
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4 An optimal approach for Ireland 
The economic downturn means that Ireland is now probably close to being on track to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions under its Kyoto commitment for 2008-2012.The segment of the 
economy already covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme will automatically be in 
compliance and so the area of uncertainty lies in the amount of foreign credits that will need to 
be purchased. Our compliance with respect to the stringent 2020 goals set by the EU may also 
have become easier though the extent depends on the timing of the economic pick-up.  
 
The current pause presents not merely a breathing space but a valuable opportunity for the Irish 
Government. Political parties can focus on the longer-term strategy and determine how to 
provide the appropriate context for building a sustainable economy. Although national 
emissions contribute but a small fraction of global emissions, meeting its EU and UN 
obligations could be important for the country in order to avoid the image of free-riding on the 
efforts of other nations. Moreover Ireland could enhance its standing and perhaps even lead the 
way by demonstrating what can be achieved by intelligent policies that focus on emissions 
reduction and avoid many usual routes that waste resources in that pursuit. The task is still 
demanding and therefore efficient approaches are needed. 
 
This paper has set out some of the policy options that are available to the Irish Government to 
reconcile its emissions obligations with its aim for economic growth.. The issue is not so much 
the technical feasibility as how to make it happen, to quote the UK’s Committee on Climate 
Change.46 There are many ways to reduce emissions; the point is that they are not all equally 
expensive or easy to implement. It involves recognising that the finite resource in question is the 
planet’s capacity to absorb our emissions, which is a resource we use to the extent that it 
benefits us as individual entities to do so. Policies must address this root of the problem, 
otherwise they will be straining against human nature. Our emissions reflect our acquired 
infrastructure and way of life and it is natural to continue to “use the capacity”, in so far as we 
can and as it remains free. This issue cannot be ducked if we wish to avoid spending sizable 
sums of taxpayers’ money on policies with disappointing results. 
 
Nevertheless it seems commonly accepted that the introduction of ideal solutions is constrained 
by political preferences, the inertia of economic sectors and the demands of public opinion. It is 
indeed difficult for government, stakeholders and citizens to become conversant with the 
empirical work on the best combination of different instruments and measures. More expensive 
                                                 
46 Committee on Climate Change, 2008, p/xiii. 
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measures may satisfy a political ideal, but such decisions, if taken, should be the result of an 
open process and a proper understanding of reasons and costs and benefits. There may be a case 
for choosing a more expensive approach to ensure equity to vulnerable members of society, for 
instance, though clearly not if there are better ways to protect them or it is merely kinder to a 
valued political constituency at the expense of society as a whole. An open process that is 
subject to public scrutiny and appraisal is less likely to be abused in such a way. 
 
As a general approach, we recommend the following criteria and priorities: 
 
• Regulatory certainty: Government should establish the necessary credible long-term 
political certainty to guide investment decisions and other areas of government policy. 
Such certainty reduces risks and creates an environment conducive to long-term 
decisions. To this end, the Government should initiate a consensus agreement on 
Ireland’s target beyond 2020, indicative short-term interim implications and the policies 
to meet such targets. Using evidence-based research and estimates of abatement costs, 
such a consensus should be struck with all- or nearly all-party agreement and should be 
based on a process of consultation and stakeholder involvement along the lines of the 
Social Partnership agreements. The need to facilitate mechanisms that result in adoption 
of the best abatement options, which may not be known, or even knowable, will then 
become clear. The envisaged Commission on Climate Change as foreseen in the 
Programme for Government would play a central role. It should be able to remove 
decision on climate policy from short-term political considerations, and may one day 
achieve an independent position. Without fear of vested interests it should be able to 
present policies that are best for the economy subject to ensuring safeguards for the 
vulnerable. 
 
• Clearly defined incentives: Given the nature of the underlying problem, a key 
requirement is to ensure a credible long-term price of carbon. Would-be investors in 
abatement technology cannot operate properly without this reassurance. To avoid 
worthwhile carbon reduction opportunities being overlooked, as at present, every emitter 
needs to be faced with this price, not just those in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
Where they currently apply, carbon prices are determined by the abatement costs of 
participants in this scheme and by its short-term targets. If it is found that having a broad 
pricing regime is insufficient to drive the target decarbonisation of the Irish economy, 
complementary measures would be required to deliver carbon reductions in specific 
sectors of the economy in an efficient and equitable way. These measures will be helped, 
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rather than hindered as at present, with the correct incentive pricing. It would reward 
results rather than inputs. 
 
• Transparent, dynamic and fair process: The process by which Ireland reduces its 
greenhouse gas emissions is similarly important. The Commission on Climate Change 
should oversee the formulation and implementation of the national climate-change 
strategy, which should be entirely open to input from stakeholders and the general public 
and be accompanied by a regular public reporting method to reveal the emission 
performance of individual economic sectors and government departments/policy areas. 
Appraisals should take all costs into account including environmental costs; to this end 
the Commission should prepare a detailed ongoing survey of abatement opportunities 
across the economy to demonstrate options and their associated costs. To the extent that 
intermediaries would automatically provide this analysis under correct carbon pricing, 
the Commission’s role would be to ensure that gaps are addressed. Relative costs of 
domestic versus foreign schemes for reducing emissions should be explicit and the 
Commission should keep abreast of technical potentials, costs and international policy 
processes. The Commission should devote significant effort to gain public support for 
climate change measures across all sectors and segments of society with correctly 
pitched information. Transparency also requires that revenues arising from the price 
imposed on carbon are tracked. Because carbon revenues (including windfalls from 
grand-parented permits) derive from the planet’s “common resource” these revenues 
should accrue to government. This is so that they are available for national use such as 
shielding the vulnerable according to need and to help the macro-economy. The macro-
economy is best helped by using the revenues in such areas as protecting 
competitiveness and reducing employment costs in particular. Sub-optimal use of 
revenues is to be resisted.  
 
How do the policy options considered in this paper perform on these criteria? The main ones are 
outlined now. 
 
Regulatory instruments have an important role to play, especially in areas where individuals 
do not have expertise, such as in building standards for example, or where a framework for 
development is needed that considers the common good, e.g. spatial planning, urban design. 
Other instances occur where the individual is discouraged from installing energy efficiency 
measures because they cannot reap a direct benefit, e.g. landlord’s properties require 
regulation as do other instances of a principal-agent relationship. It is easy for standards to 
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multiply, explode even, if they aspire to deal with every situation and action. Standards and 
regulations can impose widely different carbon reduction costs, including administration 
costs, on individuals and entities. Some expensive actions are forced on people and some 
cheap actions are omitted – such variation in abatement cost violates criterion 2 and risks 
raising abatement costs overall. On the other hand the regulated measure may be worthwhile 
in any event and may provide valuable information in to the bargain, e.g. Building Energy 
Ratings. This of course can be validated by appraisal based on an explicit carbon price. 
 
Market-based instruments, by contrast, put a price on carbon emissions. These include 
subsidies, emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes. The extent to which they secure a 
credible long-term price and encourage best actions, and the manner of their impact on the 
macro-economy and vulnerable groups, will differ according to the instrument chosen.  
 
Subsidies usually reward inputs and do not directly price emissions. Ensuing emissions 
reductions per se are brought about at a high cost that has to be funded by the general tax-
payer. Unless subsidies are in some manner awarded according to an amount of carbon 
saved their incentive properties can be weak. The application of subsidies is called for in the 
case of bodies that are capital-constrained, such as low-income households. An area where 
subsidies can pay off is in the field of knowledge and information. Economies of scale in 
gathering information that reduce the barriers, such as unfamiliarity and hassle, to would-be 
investors in energy efficiency, make subsidies to information agencies worthwhile, for 
example. The form of and relevance of information, such as relevant case studies, also 
matter. Research and Development also provide external benefits that merit subsidies.  
 
Turning to emissions trading schemes, the EU scheme has provided valuable information 
from which much can be learned. In order to control volatility in the price of carbon permits 
and thus satisfy criterion 2, a floor price and a ceiling price will need to be imposed. To 
satisfy fairness as in criterion 3, permits should be purchased at auction from the State to 
level the playing field for incumbents and new entrants and enable the correct use to be 
made of funds accruing from carbon pricing. That these issues are dealt with in some ways 
is no reason for not facing up to them squarely. 
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Carbon taxes satisfy all the desired criteria. They can provide a credible long-term carbon 
price and they correctly reward climate-friendly behaviour (including investment, R&D and 
recycling). They provide revenue, meaning that carbon taxes enable “environmental tax 
reform” – the revenue can be used to help competitiveness and employment and to support 
vulnerable groups according to need. In the case of vulnerable industries, it is found that 
they can respond well to negotiated agreements. During a fiscal contraction, the introduction 
of carbon taxes can allow other tax hikes to be softer. Moreover where they have been 
applied they have not been found wanting, either in terms of economic effect or emissions 
reduction. If operated alongside the emissions trading scheme in which a floor and ceiling 
are imposed on the price of permits (a “hybrid” ETS), the common price requirement is 
satisfied if the rate of tax is related to the forward price of emissions permits. 
 
In brief, these are the main instruments that governments have to hand and it is important to 
ensure that the instruments work together. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme is established for 
now and it deals with a sizable share of emissions. It is evident that serious improvements in the 
scheme are desirable. The effect of these would be to provide a more credible long-term price of 
carbon, to which a carbon tax applied to the remainder of the emissions would need to be linked 
with maximum flexibility allowed between them. Subsidies are an expensive approach requiring 
extra co-ordination to ensure consistency with long-term objectives. 
 
This synthesis report discussed the main policy options for reducing Ireland’s emissions and 
attempted to clarify some of the issues. In sum, Irish society as a whole will have to pay more if 
the best policies, and the best mix thereof, are not used. Less efficient policies increase the costs 
of achieving a given target and reduce the ability of the Government to drive Ireland’s 
development in a more sustainable direction. 
 
Annex 1: Annualised emission reductions 
Year 3% reduction 
(MtCO2e) 
% of 1990 baseline 4% reduction 
(MtCO2e) 
% of 1990 baseline 
1990 55.08 55.08  
 
2005 69.95 127% 69.95 127% 
2007 67.85 123% 67.15 122% 
2008 65.82 119% 64.47 117% 
2009 63.84 116% 61.89 112% 
2010 61.93 112% 59.41 108% 
2011 60.07 109% 57.04 104% 
2012 58.27 106% 54.75 99% 
2013 56.52 103% 52.56 95% 
2014 54.82 100% 50.46 92% 
2015 53.18 97% 48.44 88% 
2016 51.58 94% 46.51 84% 
2017 50.04 91% 44.64 81% 
2018 48.53 88% 42.86 78% 
2019 47.08 85% 41.14 75% 
2020 45.67 83% 39.50 72% 
2021 44.30 80% 37.92 69% 
2022 42.97 78% 36.40 66% 
2023 41.68 76% 34.95 63% 
2024 40.43 73% 33.55 61% 
2025 39.21 71% 32.21 58% 
2026 38.04 69% 30.92 56% 
2027 36.90 67% 29.68 54% 
2028 35.79 65% 28.49 52% 
2029 34.72 63% 27.35 50% 
2030 33.68 61% 26.26 48% 
2031 32.66 59% 25.21 46% 
2032 31.68 58% 24.20 44% 
2033 30.73 56% 23.23 42% 
2034 29.81 54% 22.30 40% 
2035 28.92 53% 21.41 39% 
2036 28.05 51% 20.56 37% 
2037 27.21 49% 19.73 36% 
2038 26.39 48% 18.94 34% 
2039 25.60 46% 18.19 33% 
2040 24.83 45% 17.46 32% 
2041 24.09 44% 16.76 30% 
2042 23.37 42% 16.09 29% 
2043 22.66 41% 15.45 28% 
2044 21.98 40% 14.83 27% 
2045 21.32 39% 14.24 26% 
2046 20.69 38% 13.67 25% 
2047 20.06 36% 13.12 24% 
2048 19.46 35% 12.59 23% 
2049 18.88 34% 12.09 22% 
2050 18.31 33% 11.61 21% 
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Annex 2: Carbon taxes at rates ranging from €5 to €30 per tonne CO2 
          Possible carbon tax rates (euro per tonne of CO2): 5 10 15 2
DOMESTIC
Premium Unleaded Gasoline 95 RON (litre)  0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05
Automotive Diesel - Non-Commercial User (litre)    0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05
Natural Gas - Household (kWh)  0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
Electricity - Household (kWh) 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.012
Light Fuel Oil - Household (1000 litres)  13.42 26.83 40.25 53.67
Briquettes (bale) 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.48
Premium domestic coal (tonne) 14.08 28.16 42.24 56.32
COMMERCIAL
Automotive Diesel - Commercial User (litre)   0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05
Natural Gas - Industry (10**7 kcal GCV = TOE)  11.89 23.78 35.67 47.56
Electricity - Industry (kWh)    0.003 0.006 0.009 0.012
Light Fuel Oil - Industry (1000 litres) 13.42 26.83 40.25 53.67
High Sulphur Fuel Oil - Industry (tonne)       15.67 31.34 47.01 62.68
Jet fuel (litre) 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05
Marine diesel (litre) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05
Notes: Figures are subject to rounding. 
            Emission factors from Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Sustainable Energy Ireland (
Carbon tax (euro per unit)
0 25 30
0.06 0.07
0.07 0.08
0.005 0.006
0.015 0.018
67.09 80.5
0.60 0.72
70.40 84.47
0.07 0.08
59.45 71.34
0.015 0.018
67.09 80.5
78.35 94.02
0.06 0.07
0.07 0.07
SEI).
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